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Despite the fundamental role of deterrence in justifying a system of medical malpractice law, 
surprisingly little evidence has been put forth to date bearing on the relationship between 
medical liability forces on the one hand and medical errors and health care quality on the other.  
In this paper, we estimate this relationship using clinically validated measures of health care 
treatment quality constructed using data from the 1979 to 2005 National Hospital Discharge 
Surveys and the 1987 to 2008 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System records.  Drawing 
upon traditional, remedy-centric tort reforms—e.g., damage caps—we estimate that the current 
liability system plays at most a modest role in inducing higher levels of health care quality.  We 
contend that this limited independent role for medical liability may be a reflection upon the 
structural nature of the present system of liability rules, which largely hold physicians to 
standards determined according to industry customs.  We find evidence suggesting, however, 
that physician practices may respond more significantly upon a substantive alteration of this 
system altogether—i.e., upon a change in the clinical standards to which physicians are held in 
the first instance.  The literature to date has largely failed to appreciate the substantive nature of 
liability rules and may thus be drawing limited inferences based solely on our experiences to 
date with damage-caps and related reforms.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the key rationales typically invoked to support the medical malpractice liability 
system is the notion that medical liability forces can incentivize physicians to improve the 
quality of care that they provide to patients.  Somewhat surprisingly, however, little direct 
evidence exists on whether malpractice law actually provides such a “deterrent” effect to 
physicians. Rather, the empirical malpractice literature has somewhat deemphasized 
considerations of medical quality and medical errors and has paid significantly more attention to 
the relationship between malpractice pressure and measures of treatment utilization and health 
care costs, i.e. “defensive medicine.”  Although studies of defensive medicine generally 
demonstrate that greater health care spending or utilization, prompted by greater malpractice 
pressure, is infrequently associated with significant improvements in broad measures of 
mortality, it is nearly universally recognized that such mortality measures themselves are poor 
surrogates for more direct measures of health care treatment quality. It is therefore essentially 
unknown whether the tort system is achieving one of its stated goals: to improve the quality of 
care provided by physicians through deterrent forces.  Answering this question is the focus of 
this paper.     
We approach this question using direct, clinically validated measures of health care 
treatment quality rather than aggregate mortality, which is more reflective of social, 
environmental, and personal health risk factors than of treatment quality itself.  In particular, 
using data from the National Hospital Discharge Surveys from 1979 to 2005 and the Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System from 1987 to 2008, we analyze the effect of medical 
malpractice liability on several comprehensive inpatient and outpatient health care quality 
metrics including: (1) risk-adjusted inpatient mortality rates for selected medical conditions (e.g., 
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acute myocardial infarctions, hip fractures and strokes), which have been argued to specifically 
reflect the quality of inpatient care, (2) avoidable hospitalization rates and cancer screening rates, 
which reflect the quality of outpatient care provided by physicians, and (3) adverse-event rates to 
mothers during childbirth, which reflect an alternative, patient-safety-focused indicator of 
inpatient quality.   
Collectively, these indicators account for four of the five domains of quality targeted by 
the OECD’s Health Care Quality Indicator’s project and for each of the three domains of quality 
promulgated by the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ).  We note, of course, 
that particular quality measures may induce greater liability fears among physicians than others, 
given the frequency with which lawsuits arise in the associated medical contexts.  For instance, 
cancer screening rates may be especially good measures to study the link between malpractice 
and health care quality given that missed cancer diagnoses constitute a frequent basis for 
malpractice lawsuits (Schiff et al. 2013).   
We employ two approaches to identifying the influence of liability forces on health care 
quality.  First, we take the more traditional route in the literature which typically estimates 
difference-in-difference specifications that draw upon the adoption of caps on non-economic 
damages awards and related reforms (i.e., ‘traditional reforms’ or “damage cap reforms”).  These 
plausibly exogenous reforms primarily serve to decrease the expected consequences of liability 
and by doing so allow us to evaluate the impact on health care quality of malpractice reforms 
that essentially maintain the basic structure of the tort system, but that simply blunt its severity.  
Second, in contrast to these traditional, remedy-focused reforms, we study the impact on quality 
of care of more substantive reforms which directly alter the standards of care against which 
physicians are judged in medical malpractice suits.  In particular, we study changes in state-level 
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laws which led to the retreat from rules which expected physicians to follow customary local 
practices and the contemporaneous adoption of rules that physicians be held to national standards 
of care (Frakes 2013).    
The empirical malpractice literature to date, which again has focused primarily on 
damage-cap reforms, has largely viewed medical liability forces in a rather abstract sense.  It has 
spoken about liability “pressure,” without necessarily asking: “pressure to do what?”  We 
demonstrate that this failure to appreciate the substantive nature of liability rules and the clinical 
expectations such rules place on physicians may leave analysts relying solely upon our 
experiences to date with traditional reforms with incomplete information regarding the potential 
role of medical liability in shaping physician practices.  We contend that, even if observed levels 
of health care quality happen to be relatively insensitive to the adoption of a damage cap or 
related remedy-focused reform, one would be premature to take such findings to conclude that 
physicians are, in fact, universally unresponsive to liability forces.  Relative to such traditional 
reforms, substantive reforms that change the standards against which physicians are judged hold 
the potential to more directly and powerfully influence physician practice patterns.  Such latter 
reforms thus merit separate attention.   
To understand the intuition behind the insufficiency in merely relying upon the results of 
the damage-cap studies, one must first understand the substantive nature of our present liability 
rules.  In determining the legal standards against which physicians should be judged, malpractice 
law generally defers to customary market practices.  In other words, physicians determine their 
own standards.  Liability forces in a system of this nature thus impose few independent 
expectations on physicians.  Generally, physicians in such a system may only alter their practices 
in response to liability fears due to uncertainty in their beliefs as to how courts will assess 
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customary practices—i.e., they may aim to deliver higher quality than otherwise customarily 
desired over fear that courts will misjudge customary practices to entail such higher practices.  
Damage caps may therefore only induce changes in physician practices to the extent that they 
reduce the cost of uncertainty to physicians about whether their practice patterns deviate 
negatively from customary market practices.  Caps otherwise do not alter the clinical 
expectations being placed upon physicians.   
One might not be surprised to find that the channel of influence inherent in a custom-
focused liability system is limited in its ability to independently induce substantially higher 
levels of care.  After all, as just suggested, liability forces in this system may only incentivize 
higher levels of care as a result of blind guesswork on the part of physicians.  Consider, in 
contrast, an alteration of the structure of this system altogether—for example, by changing the 
way in which the clinical standards expected of physicians are determined in the first place.  To 
the extent that these standards change in a way so as to explicitly expect higher levels of quality, 
one might be less surprised to find a substantial response in physician behavior.  Following a 
reform of this nature, physicians will not deliver higher quality of care simply because they are 
guessing that this might be expected of them at court.  Rather, they may deliver higher quality 
care as a result of explicit directions under the law to do so.  The potential channel of influence 
created by standard-of-care reforms are direct and immediate and do not operate through any 
second-order reduction in uncertainty.   
Generally consistent with expectations, our empirical analysis of the impact of remedy-
centric traditional reforms on the quality of care provided by physicians generally casts doubt 
upon the independent deterrent effect of medical liability forces in the present custom-focused 
liability system.  For each measure of health care treatment quality, the estimated effect of 
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malpractice pressure within our current liability system, as identified by the adoption of non-
economic damage caps and related tort reforms, is both statistically insignificant and small in 
magnitude, with a 95% confidence interval that is relatively tightly bound around zero.  For 
instance, at one end of this interval, the lack of a non-economic damages cap — which is 
indicative of higher malpractice pressure — is associated with only a 2 percent decrease in 
inpatient mortality rates for selected medical conditions.  
Importantly, however, while this remedy-centric-reform analysis implies at most a 
modest degree of deterrence stemming from the present system of liability rules, the results from 
the standard-of-care-reform analysis suggests that a substantive alteration of the malpractice 
system may lead to more meaningful changes in observed measures of quality.  For example, for 
each measure of health care treatment quality, we find that when states modify their standard-of-
care rules to expect physicians to provide a higher level of quality, observed levels of quality 
increase substantially in the direction of such new expectations.  Moreover, when states modify 
their rules so as to condone lower provision of quality by physicians, physicians do not appear to 
respond by delivering lower quality care.  Changing the legal standard of what is expected of 
physicians therefore has the potential to improve the quality of care provided by low-quality 
physicians without reducing the quality of care provided by already high-quality physicians.  Our 
analysis suggests that medical liability forces—under the right structural framework—hold the 
potential to elevate the quality floor.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II, we discuss existing evidence on the 
deterrent impact of medical liability.  Section III presents a simple model of physician decision-
making and discusses the various sources of ambiguity that cloud the channel of deterrence 
intended to be created by the malpractice system.  Section IV discusses the data and empirical 
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methodology.  Section V presents the results of the empirical deterrence analysis.  Finally, 
Section VI concludes. 
II. MALPRACTICE LAW AND PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR: BACKGROUND 
Relatively limited evidence exists on the degree to which medical malpractice deters 
undesirable practices and improves health care quality.1  Among those studies that do explore 
this link, most evaluate aggregate health outcome measures such as overall mortality, which by 
itself poorly reflects the quality of the various clinical processes of care that physicians use to 
improve health.  Moreover, the results of these studies paint a mixed picture.  For example, 
Lakdawalla and Seabury (2009) find that higher county-level malpractice pressure leads to a 
modest decline in county-level mortality rates., whereas other studies of the impact of 
malpractice reforms on infant mortality rates generally find no relationship (Klick and Stratmann 
2007).  Similarly, Frakes (2012), Currie and MacLeod (2008), and Dubay, Kaestner, and 
Waidmann (1999) each estimate the impact of malpractice pressure on infant Apgar scores 
(recognized as valid predictors of neonatal health outcomes),2 generally finding no evidence 
consistent with any such relationship.3   
A major limitation of the above approaches to measuring health care quality is that such 
broad, outcome-based measures are likely to be driven by many factors other than the quality of 
care actually delivered at particular outpatient and inpatient encounters (McClellan and Staiger 
1999).  These factors include differences in access to health care across regions as well as 
                                                            
1 Whatever has been done has largely been conducted rather tangentially in connection with investigations into the 
physician supply-related impacts of malpractice law or into the relationship between malpractice forces and health 
care costs and treatment utilization rates.  For a general review of the more direct evidence bearing on deterrence (up 
to 2002), see Mello and Brennan (2002). 
2 See, for example, Casey et al. (2001). 
3 Various other studies similarly calculate health outcome measures based on mortality rates that are focused on 
more targeted populations.  For instance, Kessler and McClellan (1996) estimate a trivial relationship between 
liability reforms and (1) survival rates during the one year period following treatment for a serious cardiac event 
(e.g., acute myocardial infarction),  and (2) hospital readmission rates for repeated serious cardiac events over that 
period.  Sloan and Shadle (2009) undertake a similar analysis. 
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variations in a range of other factors that the public health literature has identified as being 
meaningful determinants of health status – e.g., socioeconomic status, individual risky behaviors, 
living conditions, social support networks, etc.  Although Apgar scores and infant mortality rates 
are arguably more connected to a particular encounter – i.e., the delivery itself – delivery 
outcomes are also significantly influenced by environmental, physical and medical factors 
throughout the full term of the pregnancy and not simply the delivery.  While outcomes such as 
general mortality rates and infant mortality rates are unquestionably important, the possibility of 
a multitude of determinants of one’s health status raises statistical concerns over the ability to 
reliably identify the link between variations in the malpractice environment and the indicated 
health outcomes.   
A key advantage of focusing the malpractice inquiry on those measures emphasized by 
the medical literature is that the promoted measures are, by their very design, better reflective of 
the influence of the delivered health care itself.  Moreover, while some of the indicators continue 
to emphasize mortality-related outcomes, other indicators, such as avoidable hospitalizations, 
adherence to cancer screening guidelines, and maternal traumas, bear on a broader range of 
morbidity- and non-mortality-related impacts.  Very few malpractice studies have investigated 
the link between malpractice law and the type of quality metrics emphasized by the medical 
community.  In one recent study, Greenberg et al. (2010) document a positive association 
between adverse events incurred during hospitalizations (measured according to the Agency of 
Health Care Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) Patient Safety Indicators) and subsequent claiming 
of malpractice.  However, rather than exploring the way in which liability pressure may lead ex 
ante to improved patient safety – i.e., deterrence – they instead focus on studying how 
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improvements in patient safety (perhaps arising from a range of initiatives) alleviate ex post 
liability exposure for providers.   
One study that perhaps most directly explores the impact of liability pressure on a 
relevant set of quality metrics is Currie and MacLeod (2008).  The authors find that damage cap 
adoptions increase preventable complications of labor and delivery, suggesting that higher 
liability pressure improves patient safety.  Iizuka (2013) likewise finds that certain tort reforms—
e.g., collateral source rule reforms and punitive damage caps—increase labor and delivery-
related complications (using the ob-gyn-specific patient safety indicators promulgated by the 
AHRQ).  Interestingly, Iizuka finds no such relationship with non-economic damage-cap 
adoptions, despite the fact that non-economic damages caps arguably amount to the most 
significant reduction in liability pressure out of the four traditional reforms that he explores (Paik 
et al, 2013).  Finally, another recent study by Zabinski and Black (2012) explore the impact of 
Texas’ non-economic damage cap adoption in 2003 on a much broader range of patient safety 
indicators than that considered by Currie and MacLeod (2008) and Iizuka (2013), similarly 
documenting an increase in the incidence of adverse events upon the lightening of malpractice 
pressure associated with the damage-cap adoption.  With only one treatment group, however, the 
point estimates from this analysis should be interpreted with caution.     
Our analysis builds upon these studies in several important ways.  First, as with the 
Zabinski and Black (2012) study, we explore a broad range of both inpatient and outpatient 
measures of health care quality that goes beyond the obstetrics context.4  While obstetrics has 
formed the canonical example of research in empirical malpractice, obstetricians themselves 
                                                            
4 Zabinski and Black (2012) explore the impact of Texas’ non-economic damage cap adoption in 2003 on a much 
broader range of patient safety indicators, similarly documenting an increase in the incidence of adverse events upon 
the lightening of malpractice pressure associated with the damage-cap adoption.  With only one treatment group, 
however, the point estimates from this analysis are likely to be inconsistent (Conley and Taber 2011).   
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account for less than 3 percent of U.S. physicians.  The health care quality processes that we 
study form the ‘bread-and-butter’ practices of generalist physicians which form the largest group 
of practicing physicians.  Second, we analyze the quality of health care provided in outpatient 
settings, a setting which accounts for over 20% of the nation’s total health care dollars (CMS 
2011) and has received no special attention by the malpractice deterrence literature.  Third, as 
described below, our analysis also captures a richer degree of variation in relevant tort laws than 
that considered by both Currie and MacLeod (2008) and Iizuki (2013), resulting in arguably 
more reliable estimates.  Finally, as an alternative and arguably more robust way to investigate 
the link between liability and quality, we also consider the impact of more structural liability 
reforms that alter the clinical standards expected of physicians. 
III. MODEL OF PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR UNDER MALPRACTICE 
 
A. The effect of traditional malpractice reforms 
This section develops an illustrative model of how physician behavior is affected by 
malpractice liability and both traditional vs. substantive malpractice reforms.  Consider a 
physician faced with the decision of whether or not to undertake a quality-improving action / 
precaution, A, that comes at a cost of C to the physician.  The patients a physician treats are each 
characterized by a unique disease severity s, where higher levels of s reflect greater disease 
complexity and whereby s follows a uniform distribution across the population.  For a patient 
with disease severity s who receives action A by the physician, the benefit to the patient is B(s), 
where the benefit is increasing in s.   
Physicians decide upon a cutoff point, s’, along the distribution of patient disease 
complexity at which they begin to take precaution A.  For patients with disease complexity below 
this cutoff—i.e., for the healthiest subset of patients—the physician might deem A unnecessary 
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given its cost.  For risk factor levels above the cutoff point, they will elect to perform the action.  
Given the uniform distribution of risk factors, this behavior can be summarized by a quality 
improvement rate of 1 – s’.   
Now, first assume that the physician’s desired cutoff point is influenced solely by their 
clinical beliefs regarding the appropriateness of A given s.  She will avoid the quality-improving 
action as long as its cost, C, exceeds the benefits, B(s), of taking the precaution.  With levels of s 
beyond this point, the benefits will surpass such costs and she will undertake the quality 
improving treatment.  An equilibrium will be reached whereby the physician will set her cutoff 
point at the intersection of the benefit and cost curves.  As demonstrated by Figure 1, we signify 
this particular cutoff at ̂ݏ. 
Of course, other factors could also influence this cutoff decision.  For instance, 
physicians may be compensated more for taking precaution A (i.e., paid “fee-for-service”), which 
may shift upwards their perceived benefits curve, leading to a lower cutoff point and an 
associated higher level of precaution-taking.  On the other hand, as a result of limitations in their 
knowledge bases, the benefits that physicians perceive to follow from taking precaution A may 
fall short of the true benefits.  As demonstrated by Figure 2, the benefits that a physician attaches 
to A may actually follow B*(s).  Operating under such beliefs, physicians will set a cutoff point 
at s*, which is higher than the fully-informed (i.e., optimal) point, ̂ݏ.  In this equilibrium in 
which physicians are imperfectly informed, physicians may not provide treatment A to a subset 
of patients—i.e., those with s between  ̂ݏ and s*—for whom the true benefits of treatment exceed 
the costs.   
Continuing with the assumptions in Figure 2, next consider the marginal effect of 
malpractice liability.  First assume that the liability system is free of uncertainty and error—we 
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relax this assumption later.  The law consistently sets a particular standard of care that the 
physician is expected to follow and the physician is assumed to be able to determine with 
certainty what this standard is.  Assume further that this standard of care is initially set according 
to local customs.  Because the standard of care is based on customary practices and because 
physicians are assumed to underestimate the benefit of treatment (i.e., the perceived benefit is 
B*(s)), the standard expected under the law will be set at s*, the cutoff point (with an associated 
treatment rate of 1-s*) actually implemented by physicians as a result of their non-liability 
influences.  If a physician fails to provide the quality-improving action A to patients with disease 
complexities beyond cutoff s*, she may subject herself to liability.  If a physician fails to provide 
treatment in situations where treatment is normally not provided (i.e. s < s*), even if the true 
benefits of the precaution surpass its cost in such instances, she will nonetheless avoid liability 
due to the customary standard for liability.   
In this simple case, liability pressure only reinforces the pre-liability equilibrium of 
treatment provision (s*) and incentivizes physicians to continue setting their practices such that 
they follow a sub-optimal precaution rate of 1- s* and a cutoff of s*.  Thus, as a first-order 
matter, liability forces under a customary standard of care do not push clinical behaviors in any 
particular direction.  Consequently, in the presence of customary standards of care, diminishing 
the force of the liability system through the adoption of reforms that render the consequences of 
malpractice liability less severe—e.g., a damage cap—should not cause physicians to deviate 
from their customary practice positions.    
Now allow for uncertainty to enter the liability determination process.  Courts may 
misperceive what the customary norms of practice actually are.  For instance, consider a patient 
with a disease complexity level just below s*, in which case physicians would typically opt not 
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to perform A on someone of this health status.  If courts have imperfect information about what 
practice patterns are customary, they may make the incorrect assessment that physicians 
customarily perform A in such circumstances and thus attribute negligence to this physician.  The 
threat to physicians of malpractice may cause them to reevaluate their customary positions and 
expand their level of precaution-taking to patients healthier than s*.  This will be true if the 
expected damages from liability surpass the physician’s perceived net costs of providing 
treatment A to this patient—i.e., C-B*(s).  At some point, however, as s falls below s*, the 
probability of a negligence determination may become remote enough that the perceived net 
costs of taking the quality-improving action on such healthy patients outweighs any foregone 
liability costs and patient health benefits that could come from providing this action.  
Accordingly, physician uncertainty about the risk of malpractice liability may lead to an increase 
in treatment levels, though it will unlikely lead to a universal adoption of the treatment.  Online 
Appendix A specifies in greater detail those conditions under which imperfect information 
among courts about customary standards of care may lead physicians to increase levels of 
treatment.                 
To the extent that physicians underestimate the benefits of treatment A, the imposition of 
a liability system which imperfectly measures customary standards of care may therefore compel 
physicians to increase rates of precaution-taking in the direction of the optimum, ̂ݏ.  In other 
words, the liability system may induce some amount of welfare-improving deterrence and thus 
improve observed measures of health care quality on the margin.  Similarly, the adoption of 
reforms that reduce the expected cost to physicians of losing a malpractice suit—e.g., a damage 
cap—may undo these liability-related benefits and lead to declines in quality.  The extent of any 
such second-order increase in precaution-taking stemming from the possibility of court error is 
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theoretically ambiguous and thus so is the expected decline in quality to be observed from 
damage-cap adoptions.  We test for the existence and degree of such responsiveness in our 
empirical analysis below.   
B. The effect of substantive malpractice reforms 
Interestingly, liability-induced improvements in quality in the above framework may 
simply stem from imperfect information in courts about the customary practice patterns of 
physicians, as opposed to stemming from well-delineated legal standards that establish the 
optimal level of health care quality.  In an environment in which a physician’s liability is 
determined solely based on a physician’s accordance to customary practices, the independent and 
marginal effect of liability in deterring medical errors and improving health care quality arises 
perhaps from happenstance (i.e., imperfect information in courts).  This raises the obvious 
question of whether improvements in quality could arise more cleanly and directly by altering 
how physician behavior is evaluated by courts in the first place—e.g., by a retreat from using 
actual customary practices of physicians to determine standards, which may themselves be 
inherently sub-par, and by the imposition of standards that are based on better-informed science 
and that directly expect that physicians follow optimal clinical approaches.  We stress that this 
inquiry is more than a mere hypothetical exercise.  Many of the proposed “next generation” 
malpractice reforms under discussion by analysts and policymakers are of this nature—e.g., 
those in which liability standards are to be set according to compliance with clinical practice 
guidelines.     
To explore this question within our model, consider again a baseline similar to that 
depicted in Figure 2, whereby physicians reach an equilibrium marked by an insufficient level of 
treatment and an associated cutoff point at s*.  Consider now an alternative standard of care 
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imposed by courts whereby the law expects that physicians begin providing the quality-
improving action / precaution at ̂ݏ—i.e., at the efficient point where the true benefits of the 
precaution begin to surpass its costs.  Will this induce physicians to increase their rate of 
precaution taking?  Consider patients with disease complexity in the range between s* and ̂ݏ.  In 
this range, physicians’ own perceptions of the benefits of precaution A fall short of their costs.  
Should they fail to undertake A, however, they will now be liable under the new standard and 
will be expected to compensate patients for the forgone benefits that they would have received 
with treatment, B(s).  If physicians provide treatment, given their perceived costs and benefits of 
treatment, they lose an amount equal to the difference between C and B*(s).  However, if they do 
not provide treatment, they lose an even greater amount in damages B(s) to the patient.5  This 
induces them to provide treatment to the set of patients with complexities between s* and ̂ݏ.   
It is worth noting that physician behavior may also move in the direction of this new 
standard for reasons other than liability fears, e.g., through informational forces.  By assumption, 
physicians may have initially provided sub-standard quality due to their failure to fully 
appreciate the benefits of undertaking the relevant precaution.  By retreating from a liability 
system based on custom that only reinforced those informational deficiencies and by instead 
imposing a new liability system that sets liability standards optimally, physicians may update 
their priors regarding the benefits of precaution taking, given the saliency of information that 
may flow through liability channels.  Such updating alone may cause an increase in delivered 
quality.   
In the empirical analysis below, we test whether physicians respond to changes in 
liability standards that expect a higher (lower) standard of care by delivering higher (lower) 
levels of quality.     
                                                            
5 By assumption, B(s) is greater than C in this range between s* and ̂ݏ and thus is greater than C-B*(s).  
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
A. Overview 
We study the impact of malpractice reforms on the quality of health care provided by 
physicians, as measured by clinically validated quality metrics rather than aggregate outcomes 
such as overall mortality.  We use two data sources which provide information on metrics that 
reflect the quality of both inpatient and outpatient medical care.  First, we collect data on several 
measures of health care quality (described below) from the 1979 to 2005 National Hospital 
Discharge Surveys (NHDS), each of which provides a nationally-representative sample of 
inpatient discharge records from short-stay, non-federal hospitals.  Using the relevant diagnosis 
codes provided by the NHDS, we calculate, for each state and year, mean levels of various 
inpatient and outpatient health care quality metrics.  Second, we use data from the 1987 to 2008 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) to compute mean state-year averages of 
various cancer screening rates, a measure of outpatient quality of care.6  We then take two 
approaches in evaluating the impact of malpractice law on health care quality: (1) estimating the 
association between our observable quality metrics and the adoptions of traditional, remedy-
centric tort reforms (primarily, non-economic damage caps) and (2) exploring the relationship 
between health care quality and substantive liability reforms to the manner in which courts 
determine medical liability standards.  
B. Damage Cap Analysis 
The first part of our deterrence analysis explores the general relationship between health 
care quality and malpractice pressure, as identified by the imposition of traditional tort reforms 
                                                            
6 Not all screening measures are available over this entire time period, however.  While longer time periods are 
available for some measures—e.g., mammograms—others are only available over the 2000s—e.g., PSA testing.  
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which diminish the severity of punishment rather than modify the benchmark standard of care 
against which physicians are compared in malpractice litigation.  The immediate effect of these 
tort reforms is largely to reduce the expected levels of damages imposed in the event of liability, 
without necessarily altering the substantive nature of the liability-determination process.  
Reducing the expected damages awards, in turn, may leave plaintiffs and/or their attorneys less 
inclined to bring suit, thereby lessening the level of pressure placed upon physicians.  Though 
generally fully insured against financial risks, physicians may welcome such reduced likelihoods 
of suit to the extent that they face non-pecuniary or non-insurable costs of liability—e.g., 
psychological or reputational harms (Jena et al. 2011).  The reforms that we emphasize in this 
analysis, and that have received the most attention by the literature, are caps on non-economic 
damage awards—i.e., pain and suffering awards.  
Non-economic damages represent a significant portion of the typical malpractice award.  
For example, using a dataset of 326 closed claims in Texas from 1988-2004 (each with at least a 
$25,000 payout), Hyman et al. (2009) document an average non-economic damages award of 
$681,000, compared with $542,000 for economic damages.  Non-economic damage caps also 
represent the tort-reform measure that has been most commonly associated with an observed 
change in certain malpractice outcomes: claims severity, physician supply and malpractice 
premiums.7  Importantly, with respect to the frequency of claims—i.e., the likelihood of suit—
the documented effect of caps has varied significantly across studies (Mello and Kachalia 2011).  
This uncertainty in the literature arguably motivates exploring substantive liability reforms—
e.g., standard-of-care reforms—as an alternative way to explore the relationship between liability 
and quality.  Lending support, however, to the validity of the damage-cap approach to 
identifying the malpractice / health-care quality link, a recent study by Paik et al. (2013) draws 
                                                            
7 See Mello and Kachalia (2011) for a comprehensive review of relevant studies. 
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upon significant variation in state laws to find a roughly 29 percent drop in claims frequency 
upon a damage-cap adoption.   
Nearly thirty states currently have non-economic damage cap provisions in place, most of 
which were adopted during the malpractice crisis of the 1980’s.8  In light of the timing of this 
variation, those studies relying on post-1980s data to evaluate the impact of non-economic 
damage caps (e.g., Currie and MacLeod 2008) fail to draw on the most relevant sources of 
variation in malpractice law and consequently rely on few treatment groups.  Limited variation 
of this nature implicates concerns over the reliability of the estimated standard errors and over 
the consistency of the point estimates – that is, with few treatment groups, it is less likely that 
spurious correlations between the outcome variable and the reforms of interest will average to 
zero (Conley and Taber 2011).  The NHDS data, supplemented with geographic identifier codes, 
provides inpatient discharge records from a broad enough span of states and covering a long 
enough period of time to allow for a deterrence analysis that draws on an extensive set of 
legislative variations. 
Table 1 lists those states that modified their non-economic damage cap laws over the 
NHDS sample period.  In most specifications, we also explore the association between observed 
health care quality and certain additional types of tort reforms, including reforms of the collateral 
source rule, caps on punitive-damages awards and other “indirect” tort reforms.  Further 
descriptions of such reforms are provided in Online Appendix B.   
                                                            
8 Following Frakes (2012), we also classify states as having non-economic damages provisions if they have laws that 
place caps on total damages awards.  Such laws, after all, necessarily cap non-economic damages as well.  In light of 
the imposition of state fixed effects, this classification only has relevance in the context of 1 state (Texas) that 
adopted a total damages cap at a time when it did not have a specific non-economic damage cap in place.  Only 1 
additional state – i.e., Colorado – adopted a total damages cap over the sample period (2 years following the 
adoption of a non-economic damages cap).  With this in mind, we do not separately control for the incidence of a 
cap on total damages.  However, we estimate nearly identical results for the remaining coefficients when we do 
include this additional covariate and treat total and non-economic damage caps separately.     
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Ultimately, by rolling back the influence of the liability system through a reduction in 
pressure, without altering its substance, such reforms provide us with a mechanism to explore the 
marginal influence of the present structure of liability standards.   
C. Liability-Standards Analysis 
Unlike reforms focused on curbing remedies available to plaintiffs in malpractice suits, 
states have done significantly less experimentation along the more substantive and structural 
dimension to malpractice law—i.e., the standards against which physician behavior is judged.  
One significant exception, however, is the broad-based shift largely beginning in the 1960s away 
from the so-called “locality rule.”   
In the first half of the Twentieth Century, nearly every state had in place malpractice laws 
which judged physicians in malpractice cases against customary practices of physicians working 
in the same locality.  These laws essentially expected that physicians follow the practices applied 
by those around them.  Deviations in care from these customary standards that led to adverse 
medical events were judged as negligent.  Between the 1960s and the 1990s, however, the 
majority of states amended their substantive malpractice laws to abandon such locality rules in 
favor of rules requiring physicians to follow national standards of care, thereby harmonizing the 
legal expectations of medical care provided by physicians across states.  In light of the rampant 
regional disparities in care that have persisted across regions for decades (see, for example, 
Wennberg and Cooper 1999), one can view the move from a local to a national-standard rule as a 
meaningful and substantial alteration of the standards clinically expected of physicians (Frakes 
2013).   
Variation over time in state adoptions of the national-standard rule offer an alternative 
approach to exploring the relationship between malpractice law and health care quality, 
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specifically allowing us to examine whether the modification of malpractice standards expected 
of physicians results in a corresponding change in observed quality measures.  In terms of the 
model presented in Section III, if we conceptualize s* as representing the customary practices of 
a particular locality initially operating under a locality rule and ̂ݏ as representing the average 
customary practices of the rest of the nation, then the abdication of the locality rule may allow us 
to test for the hypothesized shift from a legally expected cutoff of s* to ̂ݏ in the precaution-taking 
and quality-improving decision of physicians.   
In related work, Frakes (2013) tests the hypothesis that, upon the adoption of a national-
standard rule for malpractice, physician practices in the affected regions converge towards 
practices of the rest of the nation, focusing on utilization rates of various obstetric and cardiac 
treatments and diagnostic procedures.  We follow Frakes (2013) and test for the impact of 
national-standard adoptions by estimating whether mean quality measures in a state that uses a 
local-standard rule converge towards the relevant national means when the state amends its 
malpractice laws to require that physicians comply with national standards of care.  Table 2 
provides more details on the evolution of malpractice-standard rules.  Roughly 14 states 
abandoned the use of local standards in favor of national standards in the post-1978 period, along 
with 1 additional state (Maryland) that retreated from a previous national-standard adoption.  
Sixteen states currently retain some element of locality in their standard-of-care laws.   
Importantly, this analysis affords us the opportunity to separately test how physicians 
respond to changes in malpractice standards which in some instances expect higher levels of 
quality and in other instances lower levels.  For each of the quality metrics that we study, a 
number of treatment states began the sample period with high quality levels while a number of 
others began with low quality levels, in which event the move towards a national standard 
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represented a change in legal expectations in both directions depending on the pre-reform level 
of quality.  In light of the possibility that physicians may respond differently to an elevation of 
what is expected of them relative to a slackening of what is expected of them, we test for 
asymmetrical responses to the adoption of national-standard rules.9 
D. Quality measures 
The acknowledgement that health care providers are falling short on quality has propelled 
initiatives designed to fill this gap (e.g., hospital report cards), along with the associated 
development of quality indicators used to implement such initiatives.  Foremost among those 
organizations developing quality indicators is perhaps the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services.  AHRQ 
measures are particularly useful for the present study in so far as they are designed for use with 
administrative inpatient databases such as the NHDS.  Accordingly, for the purposes of this 
study, we first and foremost look to the AHRQ for guidance in selecting quality metrics to 
explore.  More specifically, inspired by the AHRQ’s three domains of quality—i.e., Prevention 
Quality Indicators (PQIs), Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs), and Patient Safety Indicators 
(PSIs), respectively—we calculate three composite quality metrics: (1) inpatient mortality rates 
for selected medical conditions, (2) avoidable hospitalization rates and (3) the incidence of 
maternal trauma during deliveries.   
In building off of Currie and MacLeod’s (2008) investigation into the quality impacts of 
liability forces, we likewise consider the quality measure employed in their obstetrics-focused 
analysis and supplement our PSI-inspired maternal trauma indicator with an indicator capturing 
                                                            
9 As discussed in Section IV below, data limitations force us to focus this liability-standards analysis (at least in our 
primary tables in the text) on all measures other than the cancer screening measures.  Nonetheless, we do provide 
some limited analysis of this variety for the cancer-screening measures in the Online Appendix.   
22 
 
the incidence of an avoidable complication during the delivery of a child.  Finally, we build 
various quality indicators around cancer-screening practices of physicians, drawing upon another 
widely embraced quality domain emphasized by the medical community.   
We provide a brief overview of each metric below, with additional details regarding the 
construction of the resulting quality metrics provided in Online Appendix B.   
Inpatient mortality for selected conditions.  Following the AHRQ’s IQIs, we first 
construct a composite inpatient mortality rate for selected acute medical conditions using data 
from the National Hospital Discharge Surveys.  Unlike overall mortality rates computed over the 
entire jurisdiction affected by a relevant legal regime, IQI-inspired mortality rates are designed to 
capture mortality events likely associated with a clinical encounter itself and the associated 
quality of care during that encounter, rather than unobserved socioeconomic characteristics that 
affect overall mortality within a population.  To rule out selection concerns—i.e., concerns 
regarding the liability regime impacting the probability of patients appearing in the inpatient 
environment in the first place—this measure focuses on mortality among a subsample of 
discharges in which the primary diagnosis code indicates select medical conditions (e.g., acute 
myocardial infarction, stroke, etc.) that uniformly entail hospitalization upon their occurrence.  
We further risk adjust this composite rate for fluctuations in the incidence of the various 
conditions comprising the sub-sample.10  Such risk adjustment addresses concerns that an 
increase in the proportional incidence of one of the lesser-mortality conditions within the sample 
                                                            
10 In alternative specifications (not shown), we estimate the relationship between liability reforms and the rate of 
hospitalization for each such condition (e.g., hip fractures), where this rate is calculated relative to the total number 
of hospitalizations within this subsample of selected conditions.  The results suggest very little relationship, if any, 
between liability pressure and the distribution of conditions comprising this subsample.  For instance, at the upper 
end of the 95 confidence interval, the adoption of a non-economic damages cap is associated with only a 0.7 percent 
increase in the relative rate of hip fracture admissions among this subsample. 
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(e.g., hip fractures) could lead to a reduction in the observed mortality rate with no actual 
improvement in quality. 
Avoidable hospitalizations as a measure of outpatient quality.   The second quality 
measure that we employ captures the rate of avoidable hospitalizations (AH) within each state-
year cell, a measure that is inspired by the AHRQ’s PQIs.  Though constructed using inpatient 
data, AH rates are widely argued by physicians to reflect the quality of care prevailing in the 
associated outpatient community.  Such measures identify conditions (e.g., hospitalization for 
asthma exacerbation, uncontrolled diabetes, and uncontrolled hypertension, etc.) with respect to 
which proper outpatient care would have prevented the need for hospitalization.   
Our baseline specifications implicitly assume that malpractice liability may only impact 
AH rates through the influence of liability pressure on the quality of care delivered to 
outpatients.  However, in theory, physicians may hold some degree of discretion over the 
decision to admit patients who present to the hospital with the indicated conditions.  Liability 
may influence this hospitalization decision in various ways.  For instance, fearful over liability 
for failing to hospitalize a patient, physicians may admit those marginal patients whom they may 
have otherwise decided did not warrant hospitalization.  A response of this nature could 
confound the analysis by masking the presence of a true deterrent effect at the outpatient level.  
Of course, liability fears could also impact the hospitalization decision in the opposite direction 
if liability fears induce hospitals and providers to avoid high risk patients (Mello et al. 2005) or 
to avoid hospitalizations out of concern that hospitalization itself could lead to malpractice 
liability if an unexpected adverse event occurred.  In any event, to address such concerns, in 
alternative specifications, we construct an AH rate that focuses only on a subset of avoidable 
hospitalizations with little physician discretion over the decision to hospitalize—i.e., focusing on 
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hospitalizations that both could be prevented through quality outpatient care and whose 
incidence are generally insensitive to the discretion of admitting physicians at hospitals (e.g., 
ruptured appendix).      
 Maternal Trauma and Complications.  Patient-safety indicators (PSIs) capture 
complications and adverse events that take place in inpatient settings following surgeries, 
procedures and deliveries.  We focus our analysis of PSIs on those related to delivery / childbirth 
for two reasons.  First, as previously addressed, prior empirical malpractice literature has focused 
heavily on assessing the impact of malpractice pressure on obstetrical outcomes.  Second, many 
PSIs reflect the quality of care provided during surgeries, rates of which may be a function of the 
liability environment (e.g., rates of surgery may in theory be more or less common in 
environments with high malpractice pressure, creating issues of selection).  Rates of childbirth, 
on the other hand, are unlikely to be impacted by malpractice pressures.   
We create estimates of obstetric PSIs using data from the National Hospital Discharge 
Surveys.  For the sake of simplicity and to maximize the sample size for this analysis, we group 
together cesarean trauma events with vaginal delivery trauma events (with and without 
instruments) and thus construct a composite obstetric trauma indicator (though the analysis does 
not change substantially when considering each separately).  To look at a broader, but related set 
of obstetric-related complications, we follow Currie and MacLeod (2008) and also consider the 
incidence of preventable delivery complications—e.g., fetal distress, excessive bleeding, 
precipitous labor, prolonged labor, dysfunctional labor, etc.    
Cancer Screening as a measure of outpatient quality.  To complete our measurement of 
the quality of outpatient care, we use patient self-reports from the Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System from 1987 to 2008 to compute state-year incidences of mammography, 
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physical breast exam, Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) testing, digital rectal exam, pap smear, 
and sigmoidoscopy / colonoscopy, used to screen for breast, prostate, cervical, and colon cancer, 
respectively.  As explained in greater detail in Online Appendix B, we use national cancer 
screening guidelines to select the relevant age groups for the analysis and the window period of 
relevance for the exam—e.g., mammography within the previous two years for females and 
sigmoidscopy / colonscopy starting at age 50 and at least once every 5 years).  In Online 
Appendix C, we discuss the robustness of the above results to alternative formulations of cancer 
screening rates.   
Descriptive statistics.  On average, each NHDS state-year cell contains roughly 424 
discharges associated with the selected conditions used in the composite inpatient mortality rate 
measure, our first quality indicator.  The average inpatient mortality rate among this sub-sample 
is 8 percent, as presented in Table 3.  Likewise, each state-year cell contains an average of 
roughly 1017 avoidable hospitalizations.  As explained in Online Appendix B, we form AH rates 
by normalizing AH counts by an index of hospitalizations for low-discretionary medical 
conditions—e.g., acute myocardial infarction, stroke, etc.—in which case this denominator 
captures the size of the relevant state-year cell without itself being sensitive to legal or financial 
incentives.  With this normalization, the average AH rate across state-year cells equals 1.7.  
Furthermore, each state-year cell in the NHDS contains on average roughly 600 deliveries.  
Within this delivery subsample, maternal trauma (third or fourth degree lacerations) occurs 
nearly 4 percent of the time and preventable complications occur nearly 16 percent of the time.  
Finally, cancer screening rates among the relevant BRFSS participants ranges, on average, from 
40 to 73 percent.     
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To describe the variation in quality of care across regions, Column 2 of Table 3 provides, 
for each quality indicator, a measure of the average gap over the sample period between the 
mean state level and the associated mean national level.  More specifically, following Frakes 
(2013), we summarize this gap by calculating the mean absolute deviation between the state and 
national indicator levels (for each year) and normalizing this rate by the national level.  For 
instance, on average over the sample period, the mean maternal trauma rate within a state 
differed from the national mean trauma rate by an amount equal to roughly 26 percent of the 
national level.  Because this measure is computed over the entire sample period, this measure to 
some degree understates the regional disparity measure that is most relevant to our analysis.  In 
particular, in early years of the sample and among states which began the sample under a 
locality-rule regime, the average gap between the state and the national rate, for each of the listed 
indicators, is substantially larger than the figures provided in Table 3.  In the empirical analysis 
below, we explore whether these gaps are narrowed through the adoption of national-standard 
rules (approaching the inquiry separately from each side of the regional quality distribution).           
E. Specifications 
We estimate the effect of traditional medical malpractice reforms—e.g., damage-caps—
on the quality of care provided by physicians through the following specification: 
(1)   ܮ݋݃ሺܳ௦,௧ሻ ൌ 	ߙ ൅	઻ܛ ൅	ૃܜ ൅ 	૎ܛݐ ൅ 	ߚଵܥܣ ௦ܲ,௧ ൅ 	઺૛܆ܛ,ܜ ൅ 	઺૜܈ܛ,ܜ ൅ ઺૝۽ܛ,ܜ ൅ ߝ௦,௧ 
where s indexes state and t indexes year.  CAPs,t represents an indicator variable for the presence 
of a cap on non-economic damages in state s and year t. State fixed effects, γs, and year fixed 
effects, λt, control for fixed differences across states and across years, respectively.  Qs,t 
represents the relevant healthcare quality measure – e.g., the composite inpatient mortality rate or 
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the avoidable hospitalization rate. The coefficient of interest in each specification is captured by 
β1, representing the relationship between the relevant quality measure and the adoption of non-
economic damage caps.                
To control for a range of additional state-year factors, Xs,t represents certain demographic 
characteristics (e.g., percentage of patients in various age, sex, race and insurance categories), 
along with certain mean characteristics of the represented hospitals (e.g., bed size and ownership 
types).  Zs,t represents certain other state-year characteristics (HMO penetration rate, physician 
concentration rate, and median household income).  Os,t is a matrix representing a set of indicator 
variables for the incidence of collateral source rule reforms, caps on punitive damages, and 
“indirect” tort provisions.  In some specifications, we include state-specific linear time trends, 
φst, to control for slowly-moving correlations between the relevant quality measures in a state 
and the adoption of tort reforms by that state.11  For each of the relevant quality indicators, 
Online Appendix B provides additional details regarding the compositions of X and Z.   
For the obstetrics-focused and cancer-screening measures, we estimate a specification 
identical to that indicated above except at the individual-year level (as opposed to the state-year 
level), using, as appropriate, the full sample of deliveries in the NHDS records (for the obstetrics 
measures) or the full sample of individual respondents (of the specified age bands) within the 
BRFSS.  The dependent variables in these analogous individual specifications represent the 
individual incidence of either (1) a traumatic event to the mother—i.e., a PSI event, (2) a 
                                                            
11 Frakes (2013) documents a relationship between the adoption of laws requiring physicians to follow national (as 
opposed to local) standards and a resulting convergence in physician practices across regions.  In light of the fact 
that two of the damage-cap treatment states used in the defensive-medicine analysis below (Hawaii and Texas) were 
dropped from the specifications estimated in Frakes (2013) (due to an inability to classify the full history of their 
standard-of-care laws), we exclude controls for national-standard laws in the damage-cap specifications estimated 
below and focus instead on the traditional tort reform measures.  However, the results presented below are robust to 
the inclusion of controls for national-standard laws (not shown). 
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preventable delivery complication or (3) the receipt within the relevant time period of the 
respective cancer screening measure, depending on the specification.12    
To explore whether the quality of health care provided by physicians is affected by the 
clinical malpractice standards expected of physicians under the law, we next explore whether 
state mean rates for the relevant quality measures converge towards their respective national 
mean rates as states adopt national-standard rules.  In this investigation, however, we allow for a 
differential convergent response from the top and the bottom of the regional quality 
distribution— that is, we allow for a different response when the law changes so as to expect a 
higher level of quality of physicians compared to when the law changes so as to condone a lower 
level of quality.  Following Frakes (2013), we estimate the following specification:  
(2)       ܮ݋݃ሺܳ௦,௧ሻ ൌ 	ߙ ൅	઻ܛ ൅	ૃܜ ൅ 	૎ܛ,ܜ ൅ 	઺૚܆ܛ,ܜ ൅ 	઺૛܈ܛ,ܜ ൅ 	઺૜۽ܛ,ܜ ൅	 
ߚସܤܧܮܱ ௦ܹ ൅	ߚହܰܵ௦,௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܤܧܮܱ ௦ܹ ∗ ܰܵ௦,௧ ൅	ߝ௦,௧ 
where Xs,t, Zs,t, Os,t, γs, λt and φs,t are defined as above.  NSs,t represents an indicator for a 
national-standard law.  BELOW is an indicator for a state that began the sample period with an 
initial rate below the national mean for the relevant quality indicator.  The coefficient of ߚହ in 
this interaction specification can effectively be interpreted as the association between national-
standard laws and quality indicator levels for states with initially above-average indicator levels 
(i.e., when BELOW = 0).  Note that for all indicators other than cancer screening rates, higher 
indicator levels represent lower levels of quality (and vice versa); therefore, states with BELOW 
= 1 are those with initially low indicator levels (e.g. mortality) but actually higher than average 
                                                            
12 Similarly, this alternative specification includes Xi,s,t  as the individual-specification counterpart to Xs,t. 
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quality.  For states with initially below-average indicator levels (BELOW = 1), this same 
association is captured by the sum of ߚହ and ߚ଺.   
V. RESULTS 
A. Damage-Cap Analysis 
Overview 
Tables 4 – 8 present estimation results from specifications that explore the relationship 
between non-economic damage caps (and related reforms) and health care quality.  For each 
quality measure, we estimate an association between a non-economic damage-cap adoption and 
the relevant indicator that is statistically indistinguishable from zero, though relatively tightly 
bound around zero.13  As such, while we cannot rule out that greater malpractice pressure within 
our existing system—as identified through the lack of a non-economic damages cap—induces 
higher quality health care, we can rule out that such forces induce substantially higher levels of 
quality.  Similarly, we can rule out that damage cap adoptions which reduce malpractice pressure 
are associated with substantial reductions in health care quality (note that below we 
conceptualize our findings both in terms of whether greater liability pressures improve quality 
and whether diminished pressures weaken quality).   
AHRQ-Inspired Measures and Preventable Delivery Complications 
We begin by describing the results for the AHRQ-inspired health care quality indicators 
and the preventable delivery complications measure (Tables 4 – 7), considering that these 
measures all reflect lower levels of quality as the relevant indicator level rises (and vice versa), 
whereas the cancer screening measures, which we discuss in subsection A(2) below (and Table 
                                                            
13 Reported standard errors in Table 4 – 8 and in all subsequent tables are clustered at the state level to allow for 
arbitrary within-state correlations of the error structure. 
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8), reflect higher levels of quality as the screening levels rise.  We separate the discussions with 
this difference in mind to ease confusion in exploring the relevant associations.   
Upon the adoption of a non-economic damage cap, we estimate mean changes in the 
inpatient mortality rate for selected conditions, the AH rate, the low discretionary AH rate, the 
maternal trauma rate and the preventable delivery complication rate of only 0.8, 0.3, -0.5, -2.2, 
and -1.2 percent, respectively.14  This pattern of point estimates does not change meaningfully 
upon the inclusion of state-year covariates, other tort laws and state-specific linear time trends, as 
demonstrated by Columns 2 and 3 in each of Tables 4 – 7 and by Columns 6 and 7 of Table 5 (-
3.8, -1.0, -1.7, -0.0, and 4.2 percent, respectively). 
These estimates are not significant at the p=0.05 level of significance.  Accordingly, we 
cannot rule out that positive associations between damage caps and these various quality 
indicators exist—that is, we cannot rule out some decline in quality associated with reductions in 
liability pressure and thus some improvement in quality associated with increases in pressure.  
However, even at the upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval, we find that the adoption 
of non-economic damage caps is associated with only a 6.6, 4.9, 4.3, 5.7, and 6.9 percent 
increase in those same quality measures, respectively, as indicated near the bottom of each of 
Tables 4 – 7.  That is, higher malpractice pressure within our given liability system—captured by 
the lack of a damage cap—can at most lead to a modest level of deterrence, inconsistent with the 
idea that the current medical liability system can be used to substantially improve health care 
quality through deterrent forces.   
                                                            
14 To calculate this percent change (as distinct from a percentage-point change) for the obstetrics measures (which 
derive from linear probability models on the full delivery subsample), we divide the indicated coefficient by the 
mean incidence of such measures over the sample.  Given the log specification for the AH rate and mortality rate 
specifications, the coefficient itself can be interpreted in such percentage terms.       
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In Table C1 of the Online Appendix C, we present dynamic variants of the difference-in-
difference specifications estimated in Tables 4 – 7, which include leads and lags of the damage-
cap incidence variable, allowing us to explore how the differential in quality across treatment 
and control states evolves on a year-to-year basis (where time is captured with reference to years 
before and after adoption).  While the confidence bounds for each coefficient in this dynamic 
specification expand slightly with the inclusion of this additional set of policy variables, they 
continue to bound zero at a relatively tight rate confirming the conclusion of an at most modest 
association between damage-cap adoptions and the various quality indicators.   
Online Appendix C likewise demonstrates the robustness of these findings to various 
additional specification checks, including, among others, various alternative constructions of the 
AH rates and inpatient mortality rates (e.g., the flagging of avoidable hospitalizations using any 
diagnosis code, not simply the primary diagnosis code) and the consideration only of damage-
cap adoptions that apply to tort contexts broadly, easing legislative endogeneity concerns—i.e., 
dropping states that adopted damage caps only in the malpractice context.      
Finally, we note that the non-economic damage cap results generalize to the other 
traditional tort reforms included as covariates, suggesting a generally weak relationship between 
both inpatient and outpatient health care quality and a broader range of reforms.  In the case of 
the inpatient mortality rate, maternal trauma and preventable delivery complications measures, 
the results of an F-test of joint significance of all remedy-focused tort measures fail to reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the various tort reforms are all jointly equal to zero.  In the 
case of the AH rate specifications, the estimated coefficient of the residual reform category – i.e., 
the “indirect” reform category specified according to Kessler and McClellan (1996) – is negative 
and bounded away from zero in some specifications, suggesting an improvement in quality in 
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connection with such reforms and thus counter to any expectation that such reforms would relax 
malpractice pressures to the detriment of patient quality.15   
The above-estimated specifications include state-year controls for physician 
concentration rates (and OB/GYN concentration rates in the case of the obstetrics measures).  
Such controls may absorb any impact of the reforms that occur through changes in the physician 
population.  However, these simple controls may not absorb all supply-related consequences of 
such reforms.  One effect of non-economic damage cap adoptions sometimes hypothesized is 
that lower-quality physicians may be attracted to the jurisdiction subsequent to the reform 
(Seabury 2010), a development which could otherwise confound any attempt to isolate the 
impact of malpractice pressure on the quality provided by any given provider.  Of course, to the 
extent that non-economic damage caps would attract low-quality physicians and lead to a decline 
in observed quality – e.g., to an increase in the quality indicators explored in Tables 4 – 7 – this 
omission could only help to explain any positive effects of such reforms on the indicators 
explored.  That is, a correction for this bias would likely push the estimated impacts of the 
reforms on the observed indicators even lower, only lending further support to the claim that 
liability pressure on the margin within our current liability system does not appear to be 
substantially improving the quality of care being delivered by physicians.      
Cancer Screening Measures 
As presented in Table 8, the pattern of results from the cancer-screening / damage-cap 
analysis mirrors that from the AHRQ-inspired quality measures (with even greater precision in 
                                                            
15  One component of this residual category is the reform of the joint and several liability rule.  In alternative 
specifications (not shown), where we include the joint and several liability reform independently, we likewise 
estimate small, negative point estimates for this reform, suggesting an improvement in avoidable hospitalization 
rates in connection with joint and several liability reforms, perhaps consistent with the predictions set forth in Currie 
and MacLeod (2008).      
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the estimates).  We estimate mean associations between damage-cap adoptions and the various 
cancer screening rates that are very nearly zero in magnitude.  As above, we cannot rule out 
some level of reductions in quality—i.e., some reduction in screening rates—in connection with 
damage cap reforms that are designed to reduce liability pressure.  However, the 95-percent 
confidence bounds for each rate suggest that we can rule out substantial reductions in screening 
rates in associated with caps.  Lower bounds for these intervals suggest a 2.1, 3.0, 4.0, 1.7, 0.2 
and 3.2 percent reduction (and an even lower percentage-point reduction) in mammography, 
physical breast, sigmoidoscopy/colonoscopy, PSA testing, and digital rectal and pap smear 
examinations, respectively.  To simplify the presentation of these results, we present only the 
results from the naïve difference-in-difference specifications.  In Online Appendix C, we 
demonstrate the robustness of these findings to the addition of a range of control variables, along 
with alternative constructions of the screening rates.   
 Alternative Codification of Damage-Cap Variable: Simulation Analysis 
In the final column of each of Tables 4 – 8, along with Column 4 of Table 5, we estimate 
specifications that take an alternative approach to the codification of the damage-cap incidence 
variable.  While the malpractice literature customarily codifies damage-cap adoptions in a simple 
binary fashion (0/1), non-economic damage cap provisions, in fact, take on a range of forms 
across jurisdictions.  For instance, California imposes a flat, nominal $250,000 cap on non-
economic damages awards, while Wisconsin imposes a $750,000 cap.  One might imagine that 
California’s cap would entail a stronger reduction in liability pressure.  Hyman et al. (2009) use 
closed-claims data from Texas during the period of time prior to the imposition of its non-
economic damage cap (where such data contain information on the breakdown of economic 
versus non-economic damages associated with the claim) to simulate the potential impact of the 
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various damage-cap provisions across the various states.  More specifically, they simulate the 
percentage of a mean verdict that is reduced through the imposition of the various caps employed 
across states.   
In the present analysis, we build on these preliminary efforts by Hyman et al. (2009) and 
use the results of this simulation exercise as the relevant damage-cap variable within the 
difference-in-difference specification, as opposed to the simple binary approach.  In applying 
these simulated measures to each state-year cell, we appropriately adjust this simulated reduction 
to account for inflation in the case of those damage-cap provisions that do not tie their cap levels 
to inflation.  This codification scheme is inspired by studies in public finance (including those 
that codify the degree of Medicaid expansions, Currie and Gruber 1996).  It provides an 
empirically-informed way to ensure the comparability of the legal modifications under 
investigation, effectively reframing the treatment of the law in terms of the common function 
provided by such laws (i.e., reducing awards), as opposed to some coarse measure of their 
existence.   
The estimated mean coefficients from those specifications using this alternative 
codification of damage-cap variables do not differ substantially from those derived from the 
traditional binary approach.  In the case of inpatient mortality rates for selected medical 
conditions, AH rates, low-discretionary AH rates, maternal trauma rates and preventable delivery 
complication rates, such estimates suggest a -0.1, -3.7, -3.0, -0.0 and -3.0 percent change in the 
respective quality indicator upon an increase from 0 percent to 100% in the simulated extent to 
which a damage cap reduces a jury verdict.  These largely negative point estimates are also 
inconsistent with the expectation that reducing liability pressure through the imposition of a cap 
will lead to a decline in quality—i.e., an increase in these respective measures.  As above, of 
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course, these results are statistically insignificant and cannot rule out some degree of a positive 
association between these measures and the reduction in damage awards resulting from caps.  
The associated upper ends of the confidence intervals for these estimates suggest a 17.1, 9.3, 6.1, 
33.3, and 16.0 percent change respectively.  While the upper bounds are larger than those for the 
traditional codification approach discussed above, bear in mind that these estimates are to be 
interpreted in terms of a shift in the law that leads to a full 100% reduction in malpractice 
verdicts.   
B.   Liability-Standards Analysis 
AHRQ-Inspired Measures and Preventable Delivery Complications 
The above approach identifies the influence of malpractice law by comparing quality 
across regimes marked by different levels of expected liability awards.  Effectively taking as 
given the structure of the liability system itself, this initial approach allows us to explore the 
marginal influence of the present custom-focused liability system.  In an alternative approach to 
exploring the link between malpractice and health care quality, we estimate the interaction 
specification indicated by equation (2) above and explore whether health care quality is 
influenced by potentially more impactful reforms that directly alter the clinical standards of care 
expected of physicians.  More specifically, we explore the impact of moving from locality rules 
to national-standard rules, separating the inquiry into investigations of the effect of national-
standard adoptions for (1) initially low-quality regions—that is, regions with initially high levels 
of the AHRQ-inspired measures and of preventable delivery complications and (2) initially high-
quality regions—that is, regions with initially low levels of the respective indicators.  The results 
of this exercise are presented in Tables 9 – 12.   
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The coefficients presented in the first row of each of Tables 9 – 12 can be interpreted as 
the association between the given quality indicator and the adoption of a national-standard rule in 
those treatment states that began the sample period with initially above-average indicator levels 
(i.e., where the below-average indicator variable equals zero), representing those states with 
initially low levels of quality.  In the case of inpatient mortality rates for our selected medical 
conditions, the AH rate, the low-discretionary AH rate, the maternal trauma rate and the 
preventable complication rate, we estimate that the adoption of a national-standard rule in such 
states is associated with a substantial and statistically significant (across nearly every 
specification) decrease in the respective indicator measure and thus a substantial increase in 
health care quality (considering, again, that high quality is captured by lower levels of these 
various indicator measures).  More specifically, in the naïve difference-in-difference 
specifications with only state and year fixed effects, we estimate a 7.6, 47.4, 54.5, 12.6 and 40.3 
percent decrease in the respective quality indicator in connection with national-standard 
adoptions.  With the inclusion of various state-year covariates and state-specific linear time 
trends, these estimates remain nearly the same, suggesting a 9.0, 22.3, 27.2, 28.6, and 42.0 
percent decline in the respective indicator.  Considering that a national-standard adoption in such 
initially-low-quality states entails a shift in clinical expectations in the direction of higher 
quality, the results from this exercise suggest that liability reforms that affirmatively elevate the 
standards expected of physicians—a reform of a far different variety than damage caps—may 
indeed succeed in inducing higher quality practices.   
In Tables C3 and C4 of Online Appendix C, we present results from dynamic versions of 
the specifications estimated in Tables 9 –12.  For each measure of health care quality, the 
estimated pattern of lead coefficients for the national-standard indicators do not suggest any 
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increasing trends in the differential quality attainments between treatment and controls states 
prior to the reforms.  Pre-treatment trends of that nature may have undermined the assumption 
inherent in the difference-in-difference specification that, but for the change in the law, the 
quality indicators would have trended in the same direction in the treatment and control groups 
alike.   As such, the fact that the differential in quality emerges only upon the adoption of the 
national standard rules themselves increases our confidence in a causal interpretation of the 
documented associations.  Online Appendix C further demonstrates the robustness of these 
findings to a number of specification checks, including those listed above for the damage-cap 
analysis, along with the use of a randomization inference approach to explore the statistical 
significance of the findings.   
While practices appear to improve upon a shift in clinical standards expecting higher 
quality, the results do not overwhelmingly suggest a corresponding decline in quality upon a 
shift in legal standards arguably condoning lower quality care.  To assess this reverse question, 
we explore what happens to initially high quality states (states with initially low quality indicator 
levels) when they adopt national-standard rules, which, in the case of such states, arguably lower 
operable standards by expecting that physicians follow the lesser-quality practices applied 
elsewhere.  These results can be obtained from the relevant interaction specification by adding 
the two coefficients presented in the various columns of Tables 9 – 12 (adding the baseline effect 
in the initially low-quality states to the interaction term capturing the subsequent change in the 
quality indicator associated with moving towards an initially-high-quality state).  Across the 
various indicators, this addition suggests that a national standard adoption in the initially high-
quality states is associated with a 5.2, -1.4, -1.1, -4.3, and an 11 percent change in the respective 
quality indicator.  Only in the case of the inpatient mortality rate and the preventable delivery 
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complication rate do we observe a decline in quality—that is, an increase in the respective 
indicator—upon this change in standards arguably condoning a lower level of quality.  Even in 
those cases, of course, these responses are more modest than the responses indicated above for 
the initially low-quality states.  Further, as demonstrated by Table C4 in Online Appendix, C it 
appears that the inpatient mortality rate response emerges largely in the period of time prior to 
the national-standard adoption, suggesting that it may not even be a true response to the law 
itself.  
Cancer Screening Measures 
For this liability standards analysis, our primary tables do not include results for the 
cancer screening measures.  For some of these measures—e.g., PSA testing for prostate cancer—
data are only available during the 2000s, affording no ability to draw upon relevant standard-of-
care reforms.  Likewise, with respect to sigmoidoscopy/colonoscopy screening for colon cancer, 
data are generally unavailable in the pre-reform years for the relevant treatment states to 
facilitate a difference-in-difference analysis.  For the remaining cancer screening measures—e.g., 
those relating to breast and cervical cancer—data are available during a period of time—i.e., the 
1990s—in which Indiana, Delaware and Rhode Island can be utilized as treatment states.  Our 
intent, of course, is to separately test for the effect of national-standard adoptions for those 
treatment states with initially high and initially low cancer screening rates.16  For the breast-
cancer-screening measures, this leaves only one state—Indiana—from which to explore the 
effect of a liability reform that entails a heightening of standards.  In the case of pap smear 
testing, both Indiana and Rhode Island can be utilized as treatment states in exploring the effect 
of heightened standards.  In either case, with only one or two treatment states, the point estimates 
                                                            
16 Following Frakes (2013), we exclude from this initially-high versus initially-low analysis the state of Maryland, 
which modified its standard of care laws over the 1990s to retreat from a previous national-standard adoption, 
insofar as it is difficult to hypothesize the direction in which practices will evolve subsequent to this retreat.   
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from a difference-in-difference analysis are generally thought to be inconsistent (Conley and 
Taber 2011), leaving us with arguably unreliable estimates (given a higher degree of chance that 
spurious developments explain the findings).  As such, we do not include them alongside the 
primary results from this analysis, which draw upon much more extensive legal variation.  
Nonetheless, we present such results in Online Appendix C.  Encouragingly, such results 
likewise document an increase in quality attainment (in this case, an increase in cancer screening 
rates) upon a modification of standard-of-care rules that entail a heightening of expectations.    
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
An extensive number of empirical malpractice studies have endeavored to test for the 
existence and scope of so-called “defensive medicine.”  While deterrence of medical errors can 
be viewed as a primary objective of the medical liability system, defensive-medicine is best 
characterized as a possibly unfortunate side-effect / cost of this system.  Physicians may act 
defensively when they unnecessarily order costly tests, procedures and visits over fear of 
malpractice liability (OTA 1994).  However, even if one’s primary focus is to explore these side 
effects of liability, rather than to assess whether the law is achieving its stated goal of deterring 
medical errors, it is critical to bear in mind that labeling a response as “defensive” requires more 
than a mere understanding of whether liability encourages additional utilization of medical care.  
Since a defensive response is defined with reference to the necessity (or optimality) of the 
chosen level of treatment, this assessment requires a determination as to whether or not any 
malpractice-induced expansion in treatment is accompanied by corresponding improvements in 
quality or outcomes. 
As such, whether the goal is to make an independent evaluation of the deterrent impact of 
medical liability or to properly diagnose a defensive response to liability, it is necessary to 
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estimate the impact of the malpractice system on medical errors and health care quality.  To date, 
however, nearly all studies which assess the impact of malpractice pressure on health care 
quality focus on coarse measures of quality such as aggregate mortality rather than more direct 
measures of physician behavior.  A major contribution of our analysis is to use clinically 
validated measures of health care quality to estimate the effect of malpractice pressure on the 
quality of care provided by physicians.  In this process, it is also important to bear in mind the 
structure of the malpractice system itself, a factor generally overlooked in most empirical 
discussions of this nature.  In estimating the impacts of remedy-focused / non-substantive 
reforms such as non-economic damage caps, one is effectively teasing out the marginal impacts 
of the present structure of liability.  The confidence bounds presented in our analysis suggest, at 
most, a modest degree of deterrence stemming from the present liability system.  The mean point 
estimates suggest that this system generates little to no benefits in health care quality.  We 
caution that these findings should perhaps not be interpreted so as to suggest that medical 
liability forces are universally incapable of improving quality.  Rather, they should be interpreted 
in light of the largely self-regulatory nature of our present malpractice system.   
Given the malpractice system’s strong adherence to customary physician practices, 
practices which are themselves shaped through a variety of non-legal influences, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that when we roll back the force of the law through damage-cap-esque reforms we 
do not find ourselves in a situation where physicians face significantly weakened incentives to 
deliver quality care.  The law itself is not designed to impose independent expectations regarding 
quality.  Of course, the law may still elevate care to the extent that it discourages errant 
physicians seeking to deviate from industry custom.  Even in such instances, however, it is 
important to bear in mind that customary physician practices themselves fall far short in 
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promising the delivery of high quality care (e.g., rates of age appropriate cancer screening fall 
well below 100%), in which event legal enforcement of such custom will similarly fail to hold 
much promise.  Finally, while the threat to physicians that courts may imperfectly judge their 
behavior relative to the standard of care may cause physicians to attempt to outperform industry 
custom, they are necessarily provided with no guidance as to how achieve that end.   
The second half of our empirical analysis provides some hope, however, in the potential 
for medical liability to influence physician behavior.  Drawing upon the one type of standard-of-
care reform that states have experimented with to date—i.e., locality rule abdications—we 
investigate the impact of changing the clinical standards of care imposed upon physicians under 
the law, both in terms of elevated standards and slackened standards.  All told, it appears that the 
relationship between health care quality and changes in clinical malpractice standards works in 
an expansionary direction only.  That is, once physicians provide a high level of quality, they 
may maintain such practices even when the law may loosen its expectations at a later date.  In 
contrast, physicians who provide a quality of care that is below what is expected by the law raise 
their practice to meet the higher expectations set by the law.  Malpractice forces may therefore 
be effective in elevating the quality floor.  This pattern of results is arguably consistent with an 
interpretation in which informational forces constitute the mechanism of action behind any 
responsiveness in behavior to legal standards, as hypothesized above and as distinct from 
traditionally hypothesized fear-of-liability channels.  Further work, however, is warranted to 
tease out the underlying story behind such responses and to distinguish informational 
mechanisms from traditional fear-based liability mechanisms. 
If our findings are taken to suggest that structural reforms to the way in which physicians 
are evaluated may substantially alter health care delivery practices, one may wonder whether 
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subsequent reforms that blunt the impact of the now altered liability system—e.g., damage 
caps—may cause practices to revert back to where they were before the structural reforms.  
Informational considerations may likewise suggest why this may not be so.  If physicians, 
especially newer physicians, form beliefs over proper practices to a large extent through their 
own past experiences or through the observation of the practices followed by others around them 
(Phelps and Mooney 1993), then a shift in medical practices that arises in any manner—even that 
arising from fear over being out of compliance with changed legal expectations—may more 
gradually come to be assimilated into the belief structure of physicians over time.  As such, 
malpractice-induced changes in practices may come to shape more durable physician norms and 
customs that may survive subsequent diminishment of liability forces.  These considerations may 
thus help us understand why damage cap adoptions—which primarily arose in states after 
previous retreats from the locality rule—did not cause physician practices to revert back to their 
locality-rule-era levels.   
Empirical malpractice investigations that fail to consider the equilibrium reached between 
liability forces and non-liability forces over time, and that fail to appreciate the structural 
considerations underlying tort law, may misinterpret the findings derived from our experiences 
to date with traditional remedy-centric tort reforms.  Such findings may suggest only a weak 
responsiveness to the law despite a potentially meaningful role for the law to play in shaping 
clinical practices and health care quality.  Substantial work remains, of course, to understand the 
liability structure that will best serve society.  Our analysis demonstrates that it would be 
premature to rule out medical liability from the health care quality discussion based on the 
limited findings that derive from damage-cap-focused studies.   
 
REFERENCES 
43 
 
Baicker, Katherine, Elliot Fisher, and Amitabh Chandra.  2007.  Malpractice Liability Costs And 
The Practice Of Medicine In The Medicare Program.  Health Affairs, 26, 841-52. 
Blumstein, James.  2002.  The Legal Liability Regime: How Well is it Doing in Assuring 
Quality, Accounting for Costs, and Coping with an Evolving Reality in the Health Care 
Marketplace.  Annals of Health Law 11, 125-146. 
Blumstein, James.  2006.  Medical Malpractice Standard-Setting: Developing Malpractice “Safe 
Harbors” as a new Role for QIOs?  Vanderbilt Law Review 59, 1017 – 1049.   
Carter, Mary.  Variations in Hospitalization Rates among Nursing Home Residents: The Role of 
Discretionary Hospitalizations.  Health Services Research 38, 1177-1206. 
Casey, Brian M., Donald D. McIntire, and Kenneth J. Leveno.  2001.  The continuing value of 
the Apgar score for the assessment of the newborn infants.  New England Journal of Medicine 
344, 467 –71. 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.  2010.  National Health Expenditure Accounts: 
Tables.  Available at: http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/tables.pdf  (accessed June, 17 
2012).   
Chandra, Amitabh, and Douglas O. Staiger.  2007.  Productivity Spillovers in Healthcare: 
Evidence From the Treatment of Heart Attacks.  Journal of  Political Economy 115, 103-40. 
Cohen, Thomas.  2005.  Punitive Damage Awards in Large Counties, 2001.  Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Selected Findings. 
Conley, Timothy, and Christopher Taber.  2011.  Inference with ‘Difference-in-Differences’ with 
a Small Number of Policy Changes.  The Review of Economics and Statistics 1, 113-25.   
Currie, Janet, and W. Bentley MacLeod.  2008.  First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth 
Outcomes.  Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 795-830. 
Dafny, Leemore, and Jonathan Gruber.  2005.  Public Insurance and Child Hospitalizations: 
Access and Efficiency Effects.  Journal of Public Economics 89, 109-29. 
Dubay, Lisa, Robert Kaestner, and Timothy Waidmann.  1999.  The Impact of Malpractice Fears 
on Cesarean Section Rates.  Journal of Health Economics 18, 491-522.  
Frakes, Michael.  2012.  Defensive Medicine and Obstetric Practices.  Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies, forthcoming. 
44 
 
Frakes, Michael.  2013.  The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations in 
Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules.  American 
Economic Review, forthcoming. 
Greenberg, Michael D., Amelia M. Haviland, J. Scott Ashwood, and Regan Main.  2010.  Is 
better patient safety associated with less malpractice activity?  Evidence from California.  Santa 
Monica: RAND Institute for Civil Justice.   
Hyman, David, Bernard Black, Charles Silver & William Sage.  2009.  Estimating The Effect of 
Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas.  Journal of Legal Analysis 1,  
355-409. 
Iizuka, Toshiaki.  2013.  Does Higher Malpractice Pressure Deter Medical Errors?  56 Journal of 
Law and Economics 1, 161-88. 
Institute of Medicine Committee on Quality of Health Care in America.  2000.  To Err Is 
Human: Building a Safer Health System.  Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Jena, Anupam, Seth Seabury, Darius Lakdawalla, and Amitabh Chandra. 2011. Malpractice Risk 
according to Physician Specialty.  New England Journal of Medicine 365, 629-636. 
Kessler, Daniel, and Mark McClellan.  1996.  Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?  
Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 353-90. 
Klick, Jonathan, and Thomas Stratmann.  2007.  Medical Malpractice Reform and Physicians in 
High-Risk Specialties.  Journal of Legal Studies 36, S121-S142. 
Lakdawalla, Darius, and Seth Seabury.  2009.  The Welfare Effects of Medical Malpractice 
Liability.  NBER Working Paper No. 15383. 
Localio, A. Russell, Ann Lawthers, Troyen Brennan, Nan Laird, Liesi Hebert, Lynn Peterson, 
Joseph Newhouse, Paul Weiler, and Howard Hiatt. 1991.  Relation between malpractice claims 
and adverse events due to negligence: results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III.  New 
England Journal of Medicine 325, 245-51. 
Malani, Anup, and Julian Reif.  Accounting for Anticipation Effects: An Application to Medical 
Malpractice Tort Reform.  NBER Working Paper No. 16593. 
McClellan, Mark, and Douglas Staiger.  1999.  The Quality of Health Care Providers.  NBER 
Working Paper No. 7327. 
McGlynn, Elizabeth A., Steven M. Asch, John Adams, Joan Keesey, Jennifer Hicks, Alison 
DeCristofaro, and Eve A. Kerr.  2003.  The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the 
United States.  New England Journal of Medicine 348, 2635-2645. 
45 
 
Mello, Michelle M.  2006.  Medical Malpractice: Impact of the Crisis and Effect of State Tort 
Reforms.  Research Synthesis Report #10.  New Brunswick, NJ: Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation.   
Mello, Michelle M., and Troyen A. Brenan.  2002.  Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and 
Evidence for Malpractice Reform.  Texas Law Review 80, 1595-1637.   
Mello, Michelle M. and Allen Kachalia.  2010.  Evaluation of options for medical malpractice 
system reform: a report to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, (MedPAC, 2010), 
available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Apr10_MedicalMalpractice_ 
CONTRACTOR.pdf. 
Mello, Michelle M., David M. Studdert, Catherine M. DesRoches, Jordon Peugh, Kinga Zapert, 
Troyen A. Brennan, and William M. Sage.  2005.  Effects of a Malpractice Crisis on Specialist 
Supply and Patient Access to Care.  Annals of Surgery 242, 621-628. 
National Center for Health Statistics.  1977-2005.  National Hospital Discharge Survey.  Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (last accessed at NCHS Research Data Center on January 31, 
2012). 
Office of Technology Assessment.  1994.  Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice.  OTA-
H--6O2. 
Paik, Myungho, Bernard Black and David Hyman.  2013.  The Receding Tide of Medical 
Malpractice Litigation Part 2: Effect of Damage Caps.  Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 
forthcoming.   
Peters, Phillip.  2008.  Resuscitating Hospital Enterprise Liability.  73 Missouri Law Review 
369, 369-97. 
Schiff, Gordon, Ann Louise Puopolo, Anne Huben-Kearney, Winnie Yu, Carol Keohane, Peggy 
McDonough, Bonnie R. Ellis, David W. Bates, and Madeleine Biondolillo.  2013.  Primary Care 
Closed Claims Experience of Massachusetts Malpractice Insurers.  JAMA Internal Medicine, 
forthcoming.    
Seabury, Seth.  2010.  Does Malpractice Liability Reform Attract High Risk Doctors?  RAND 
Working Paper No. WR-674-ICJ. 
Sloan, Frank A., and John H. Shadle.  Is there empirical evidence for “Defensive Medicine”?  A 
reassessment.  Journal of Health Economics 28, 481-491.  
Studdert, David M., Michelle M. Mello, Atul A. Gawande, Tejal K. Ghandi, Allen Kachalia, 
Catherine Yoon, Ann Louise Puopolo and Troyen A. Brennan.  2006.  Claims, Errors, and 
Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation.  New England Journal of Medicine 
354, 2024-2033.     
46 
 
Wennberg, John E.  1984.  Dealing With Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action.  
Health Affairs 3, 6-32.  
Wennberg, John E., and Megan McAndrew Cooper (Eds.).  1999.  The Quality of  Medical Care 
in the United States: A Report on the Medicare Program.  The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care in 
the United States.  Chicago: American Health Association Press. 
Weissman, Joel S., Constantine Gatsonis, and Arnold Epstein.  1992.  Rates of Avoidable 
Hospitalization by Insurance Status in Massachusetts and Maryland.  JAMA 268, 2388-2394.  
Zabinski, Zenon and Bernard Black.  2013.  The Effect of Tort Reform on Patient Safety:  
Evidence from Texas. 
Zeiler, Kathryn, Charles Silver, Bernard Black, David Hyman, and William Sage.  2007.  
Physicians' Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 
1990-2003.  Journal of Legal Studies 36, S9-S45.  
47 
 
 
 
 
B(s)
C
C
os
ts
 a
nd
 B
en
ef
its
 in
 D
ol
la
rs
s
Complication Level Presented by Patient
Figure 1
10
B(s)
B*(s)
0
C
os
ts
 a
nd
 B
en
ef
its
 in
 D
ol
la
rs
s s*
Complication Level Presented by Patient
Figure 2
0 1
48 
 
Table 1.  Variations in Non-Economic Damage Caps (1979-2005) 
State Year Adopted Year Dropped State Year Adopted Year Dropped 
Alaska 1986  Mississippi 2003  
Alabama 1987 1992 Montana 1996  
Colorado 1987  North Dakota 1996  
Florida 2004  New Hampshire 1987 (2) 1981 (1); 1991(2) 
Hawaii 1987  Ohio 2003 (2) 1992(1) 
Idaho 1988  Oklahoma 2004  
Illinois 1995 1998 Oregon 1988 2000 
Kansas 1987  Texas 2004(2) 1988(1) 
Massachusetts 1987  Utah 1988  
Maryland 1987  Washington 1986 1990 
Michigan 1987  Wisconsin 1986  
Minnesota 1986 1990 West Virginia 1986  
Missouri 1986     
Notes: years of adoption and invalidation/repeal (if applicable) of laws imposing caps on non-economic damage awards in 
malpractice cases (or tort cases generally) are indicated above.  States are only included if their relevant malpractice laws varied 
over the 1979 – 2005 period.  Legislative variation is excluded from this table if it represents a situation in which an adoption and 
invalidation/repeal occurred during the same year.  Source: Database of State Tort Law Reforms (2nd).   
 
Table 2.  Variations in National-Standard Rules (1979-2005) 
State Year Adopted Year Dropped State Year Adopted Year Dropped 
Alabama 1980  Montana 1985  
Colorado 1983  Oklahoma 1984  
Connecticut 1984  Rhode Island 1998  
Delaware 1999  South Carolina 1981  
D.C. 1980  South Dakota 1988  
Indiana 1992  West Virginia 1986  
Maryland  1994 Wyoming 1981  
Mississippi 1983     
Notes: years of adoption and repeal (if applicable) of laws requiring that physicians follow national (as opposed to local) 
standards of care in malpractice actions.  States are only included if their relevant malpractice laws varied within the 1979 – 2005 
period.  Source: Frakes (2013).   
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean (Standard Deviation) 
Percentage Absolute 
Deviation between State and 
National Mean 
    
Panel A: Quality Measures (NHDS)    
Composite Inpatient Mortality Rate  0.08 (0.03) 
0.16 
(0.15) 
Avoidable Hospitalization Rate 
(Avoidable Hospitalizations Scaled by 
Low-Variation Health Index) 
 1.70 (0.42) 
0.17 
(0.18) 
Low-Discretionary Avoidable 
Hospitalization Rate  
1.00 
(0.23) 
0.15 
(0.15) 
Maternal Trauma Rate   0.04 (0.02) 
0.26 
(0.25) 
Maternal Preventable Complications 
Rate   
0.16 
(0.06) 
0.20 
(0.20) 
Panel B: Cancer-Screening Rates 
(BRFSS)    
 
Mammogram (within last year, female 
age 40-75)  
0.73 
(0.45) - 
Physical breast exam (within last year, 
female age 40-75)  
0.64 
(0.48) - 
Proctoscopic exam (sigmoidoscopy or 
colonoscopy within last 5 years, age 
50-75) 
 0.40 (0.49) - 
PSA Testing (within last year, age 50-
75)  
0.53 
(0.50) - 
Digital Rectal Exam for Prostate 
Cancer (within last year, age 50-75)  
0.50 
(0.50) - 
Pap smear (within last year, age 21+)  0.60 (0.49) - 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Quality measures in Panel A are from a sample of 1190 state-year 
cells from the 1979 – 2005 NHDS files.  Quality statistics in Panel A are weighted by the relevant denominator used 
in the state-year quality rate (e.g., the state-year delivery count or the state-year low-variation health index).   
Source: Panel A: National Hospital Discharge Survey (1979-2005), Panel B: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (1987-2008). 
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Table 4: Relationship between Remedy-Centric Tort Reforms and Inpatient Mortality Rate  
for Selected Conditions (Logged, Risk-Adjusted) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Non-Economic Damage Cap 0.008 (0.030) 
-0.012 
(0.028) 
-0.038 
(0.030) - 
Damage Cap Strength:  
     Simulated Percentage  
     Decline in Mean Verdict 
- - - -0.001 (0.086) 
Collateral Source Rule Reform     - 0.015 (0.025) 
0.014 
(0.041) 
0.013 
(0.023) 
Punitive Damage Cap - -0.001 (0.038) 
0.006 
(0.047) 
0.001 
(0.038) 
“Indirect” Tort Law - 0.009 (0.027) 
0.003 
(0.027) 
0.005 
(0.029) 
95% Confidence Band for Coefficient 
of Non-Economic Damage Cap 
Variable 
[-0.052, 
0.066] 
[-0.068, 
0.043] 
[-0.099, 
0.022] 
[-0.172, 
[0.171] 
F-Statistic (Malpractice Variables 
Jointly = 0) - 0.15 0.49 0.10 
Prob > F (p value) - 0.96 0.74 0.98 
Control Variables? NO YES YES YES 
State-Specific Linear Trends? NO NO YES YES 
N 1154 1141 1141 1141 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in 
parentheses.  All regressions included state and year fixed effects and are weighted by the number of 
admissions (for the relevant state and year) in the sub-sample of discharges associated with the selected 
conditions (i.e., the sum of discharges for acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, acute stroke, 
gastrointestinal bleeding, hip fracture or pneumonia).  Mortality rates are risk-adjusted for the incidence 
(among the sub-sample) of each of the conditions comprising the sub-sample of selected conditions.     
Source: 1979 – 2005 National Hospital Discharge Surveys. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.  Relationship between Remedy-Centric Tort Reforms and Avoidable Hospitalization Rates (Logged) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
 RATES BASED ON ALL AVOIDABLE HOSPITALIZATIONS  
RATES BASED ON LOW-DISCRETIONARY 
AVOIDABLE HOSPITALIZATIONS 
         
Non-Economic Damage Cap 0.003 (0.023) 
-0.016 
(0.026) 
-0.010 
(0.029) - 
-0.005 
(0.024) 
-0.023     
(0.023) 
-0.017 
(0.024) - 
Damage Cap Strength:  
     Simulated Percentage  
     Decline in Mean Verdict 
- - - -0.037 (0.064) - - - 
-0.030  
(0.045) 
Collateral Source Rule Reform     - 0.020 (0.026) 
0.012 
(0.032) 
0.019 
(0.027) - 
0.007 
(0.024) 
0.018 
(0.034) 
0.004 
(0.024) 
Punitive Damage Cap - 0.032 (0.033) 
-0.012 
(0.036) 
0.033 
(0.032) - 
0.002 
(0.029) 
-0.014 
(0.040) 
0.004 
(0.028) 
“Indirect” Tort Law - -0.082 (0.049) 
-0.067** 
(0.032) 
-0.083 
(0.050) - 
-0.077* 
(0.043) 
-0.076**    
(0.028) 
-0.081* 
(0.042) 
95% Confidence Band for 
Coefficient of Non-Economic 
Damage Cap Variable  
[-0.044, 
0.049] 
[-0.069, 
0.037] 
[-0.068, 
0.048] 
[-0.167, 
0.093] 
[-0.052,   
0.043] 
[-0.069, 
0.023] 
[-0.067, 
0.023] 
[-0.122, 
0.061] 
F-Statistic (Malpractice 
Variables Jointly = 0) - 1.28 1.89 1.45 - 2.17 3.43 2.51 
Prob > F (p value) - 0.29 0.13 0.23 - 0.086 0.015 0.054 
Control Variables? NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
State-Specific Linear Trends? NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
N 1190 1177 1177 1177 1190 1177 1177 1177 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.  All 
regressions included state and year fixed effects and are weighted by the low-variation health index (i.e., the sum of 
discharges for acute myocardial infarction, stroke, hip fracture or gastrointestinal bleeding) associated with each state-
year cell.  The low-variation index constitutes the denominator for the relevant avoidable hospitalization rate.  
Source: 1979 – 2005 National Hospital Discharge Surveys. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 6: Relationship between Tort Reforms and the Incidence of Maternal Trauma among Individual Sample of Deliveries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Non-Economic Damage Cap -0.001 (0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.004) - 
Damage Cap Strength:  
     Simulated Percentage  
     Decline in Mean Verdict 
- - - -0.000 (0.008) 
Collateral Source Rule Reform     - 0.001 (0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Punitive Damage Cap - -0.005 (0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
“Indirect” Tort Law - 0.003 (0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
95% Confidence Band for Coefficient of Non-
Economic Damage Cap Variable 
[-0.005, 
0.003] 
[-0.008, 
0.003] 
[-0.007, 
0.007] 
[-0.016, 
0.015] 
95% Confidence Band, scaled by mean trauma 
incidence 
[-0.115, 
0.057] 
[-0.180, 
0.073] 
[-0.162, 
0.151] 
[-0.356, 
0.333] 
F-Statistic (Malpractice Variables Jointly = 0) - 0.50 1.06 1.14 
Prob > F (p value) - 0.73 0.38 0.35 
Control Variables? NO YES YES YES 
State-Specific Linear Trends? NO NO YES YES 
N 737193 565201 565201 565201 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in 
parentheses.  All regressions included state and year fixed effects.   
Source: 1979 – 2005 National Hospital Discharge Surveys. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 7: Relationship between Remedy-Centric Tort Reforms and the Incidence  
of Preventable Delivery Complications among Individual Sample of Deliveries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Non-Economic Damage Cap -0.002 (0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.008) - 
Damage Cap Strength:  
     Simulated Percentage  
     Decline in Mean Verdict 
- - - -0.005 (0.015) 
Collateral Source Rule Reform    - -0.008 (0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
Punitive Damage Cap - -0.004 (0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
“Indirect” Tort Law - -0.000 (0.008) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
95% Confidence Band for 
Coefficient of Non-Economic 
Damage Cap Variable 
[-0.014, 
0.011] 
[-0.007, 
0.017] 
[-0.009, 
0.023] 
[-0.035, 
0.026] 
95% Confidence Band, scaled 
by mean trauma incidence 
[-0.086, 
0.068] 
[-0.043, 
0.105] 
[-0.056, 
0.142] 
[-0.216, 
0.160] 
F-Statistic (Malpractice 
Variables Jointly = 0) - 0.50 0.44 0.26 
Prob > F (p value) - 0.74 0.78 0.90 
Control Variables? NO YES YES YES 
State-Specific Linear Trends? NO NO YES YES 
N 737193 566249 566249 566249 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the 
error term are reported in parentheses.  All regressions included state and 
year fixed effects.   
Source: 1979 – 2005 National Hospital Discharge Surveys. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 8: Relationship between Remedy-Centric Tort Reforms and Cancer Screening Rates  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
 MAMMO-
GRAM 
PHYSICAL 
BREAST 
EXAM 
PROCTO-
SCOPIC 
EXAM 
PSA 
TESTING 
DIGITAL 
RECTAL 
EXAM 
PAP 
SMEAR 
       
Non-Economic Damage Cap -0.003      (0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
95% Confidence Band for 
Coefficient of Non-
Economic Damage Cap 
Variable 
[-0.015, 
0.008] 
[-0.019, 
0.009] 
[-0.016, 
0.003] 
[-0.009, 
0.013] 
[-0.001, 
0.030] 
[-0.019, 
0.005] 
95% Confidence Band, 
scaled by mean screening 
rate 
[-0.021, 
0.011] 
[-0.030, 
0.014] 
[-0.040, 
0.008] 
[-0.017, 
0.025] 
[-0.002, 
0.060] 
[-0.032, 
0.008] 
N 1009965 1155814 843960 252232 340931 1662616 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in 
parentheses.  All regressions included state and year fixed effects.  
Source: 1987 – 2008 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Records. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 9.  The Relationship between National-Standard Laws and Inpatient  
Mortality Rate for Selected Conditions (Logged, Risk-Adjusted) 
  
 
 
 
   
 (1) (2) (3) 
National-Standard (NS)  
     Law Dummy 
-0.076** 
(0.035) 
-0.093** 
(0.040) 
-0.090 
(0.081) 
NS Law * Below Avg.  
     State 
0.128* 
(0.073) 
0.171** 
(0.65) 
0.186 
(0.109)* 
          N 1104 1093 1093 
Control Variables? NO YES YES 
State-Specific Linear 
Trends? NO NO YES 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the 
error term are reported in parentheses.  All regressions include state and 
year fixed effects and are weighted by the number of admissions (for the 
relevant state and year) in the sub-sample of discharges associated with 
the selected conditions (i.e., the sum of discharges for acute myocardial 
infarction, heart failure, acute stroke, gastrointestinal bleeding, hip 
fracture or pneumonia).  Mortality rates are risk-adjusted for the 
incidence (among the sub-sample) of each of the conditions comprising 
the sub-sample of selected conditions..  The regressions also include a 
separate dummy variable indicating whether the state has an initially 
below-average inpatient mortality rate (coefficient omitted).  Utilization 
data is from the NHDS. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
56 
 
Table 10.  The Relationship between National-Standard Laws and Avoidable Hospitalization Rates  
(Logged, Normalized by Low-Variation Health Index)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
RATES BASED ON ALL AVOIDABLE 
HOSPITALIZATIONS 
RATES BASED ON LOW-DISCRETIONARY 
AVOIDABLE HOSPITALIZATIONS 
National-Standard (NS)  
     Law Dummy 
-0.474*** 
(0.077) 
-0.331*** 
(0.064) 
-0.223*** 
(0.036) 
-0.545*** 
(0.075) 
-0.399*** 
(0.064) 
-0.272*** 
(0.051) 
NS Law * Below Avg.  
     State 
0.460*** 
(0.130) 
0.290** 
(0.113) 
0.201*** 
(0.046) 
0.534*** 
(0.126) 
0.381*** 
(0.113) 
0.247*** 
(0.071) 
          N 1139 1128 1128 1139 1128 1128 
Control Variables? NO YES YES NO YES YES 
State-Specific Linear 
Trends? NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.  All 
regressions include state and year fixed effects and are weighted by the low-variation health index (i.e., the sum of 
discharges for acute myocardial infarction, stroke, hip fracture or gastrointestinal bleeding) associated with each state-year 
cell.  The regressions also include a separate dummy variable indicating whether the state has an initially below-average 
avoidable hospitalization rate or low-discretionary avoidable hospitalization rate, as appropriate (coefficient omitted).  
Utilization data is from the NHDS. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 11.  The Relationship between National-Standard Laws and  
The Rate of Maternal Trauma among Deliveries (Logged) 
  
 
 
 
   
 (1) (2) (3) 
National-Standard (NS)  
     Law Dummy 
-0.126 
(0.190) 
-0.195 
(0.124) 
-0.286*** 
(0.082) 
NS Law * Below Avg.  
     State 
0.083 
(0.229) 
0.058 
(0.177) 
0.224 
(0.215) 
          N 1089 1076 1076 
Control Variables? NO YES YES 
State-Specific Linear 
Trends? NO NO YES 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the 
error term are reported in parentheses.  All regressions include state and 
year fixed effects and are weighted by the number of deliveries 
associated with the relevant state-year cell.  The regressions also include 
a separate dummy variable indicating whether the state has an initially 
below-average trauma rate (coefficient omitted).  Utilization data is from 
the NHDS. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 12.  The Relationship between National-Standard Laws and the  
Rate of Preventable Complications During Deliveries (Logged).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (4) (5) (6) 
  
National-Standard (NS)  
     Law Dummy 
-0.403*** 
(0.086) 
-0.445*** 
(0.070) 
-0.420*** 
(0.101) 
NS Law * Below Avg.  
     State 
0.513*** 
(0.135) 
0.466*** 
(0.103) 
0.495*** 
(0.175) 
          N 1089 1076 1076 
Control Variables? NO YES YES 
State-Specific Linear 
Trends? NO NO YES 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the 
error term are reported in parentheses.  All regressions include state and 
year fixed effects and are weighted by the number of deliveries 
associated with the relevant state-year cell.  The regressions also include 
a separate dummy variable indicating whether the state has an initially 
below-average preventable complication rate (coefficient omitted).  
Utilization data is from the NHDS. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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DOES MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW IMPROVE HEALTH CARE 
QUALITY? 
By MICHAEL FRAKES AND ANUPAM B. JENA 
 
 
Online Appendix A: Conditions under which Probability of Court Error Will Induce 
Increase in Precaution-Taking Rate.   
Consider a situation as in Figure 2 of the text.  The benefits of the precaution perceived by the 
physician, as a function of s, B*(s), intersects with the costs of the precaution, C, at s*.  Consider 
a patient with risk characteristics, s, just below s*.  Typically, the physician would perceive the 
costs of the precaution as being greater than the benefits and elect not to provide the precaution 
for this patient.  However, introduce the possibility that courts will err and expect that physicians 
indeed provide the precaution to this patient.  We assume that physicians will reevaluate their 
inclinations not to provide the precaution to this patient by comparing the expected level of 
damages that may ensue from failing to provide the precaution to this patient with the perceived 
net cost, in the eyes of the physician, associated with providing the patient with this precaution.  
This latter cost is easily specified.  In this range below s*, the cost of the precaution exceed the 
benefits of providing the precaution perceived by the physician by an amount equal to C – B*(s).  
As long as the expected liability associated with not providing the precaution to this patient is 
less than this perceived cost of treatment, the physician will continue to avoid providing the 
precaution in the face of this patient.  If expected liability costs exceed these perceived net costs 
of precaution, the physician will go against their normal instincts and provide the precaution 
(note that we are simply assuming risk neutrality here).  As such, to specify those conditions 
under which the possibility of court err in ascertaining customary practices will cause physicians 
to increase their precaution-taking rate, we must determine at what complication level, s, the 
expected liability costs at least equal C – B*(s).        
For a given s in the range below s*, the expected liability damages associated with not providing 
the precaution will depend on the distribution of court-determined damages.  Even though the 
true customary perceived benefits of providing the precaution equal B*(s) at this level of s, 
assume, for instance, that a court will err by implicitly assuming that the perceived benefits equal 
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B**(s), a level that now exceeds the costs, C, of providing the precaution.  If the precaution is 
not provided, assume that courts will assess a level of damages equal to the forgone benefits 
associated with the precaution, B**(s), net of the costs of the precaution—i.e., B**(s) – C.  As 
such, the expected liability costs will equal the expected value of such amounts over the 
distribution of possible B**(s)’s (subject to the condition that such damage amounts be greater 
than zero).  For simplicity, assume that each possible B**(s) is simply a shift upwards of B*(s) 
by an amount equal to k.  As such, for a given s, the expected liability damages equals: 
න ݂ሺ݇ሻ
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
ሺܤ∗ሺݏ ൅ ݇ሻ െ ܥሻ ∗ ܫሺܤ∗ሺݏ ൅ ݇ሻ െ ܥ ൐ 0ሻ 
Thus, in the face of uncertainty regarding the courts assessment of where customary standards 
lie, physicians will increase their precaution-taking rate and thus lower their operable cut-off 
point below s* until the point at which 
	
ܥ െ ܤᇱሺݏሻ ൌ න ݂ሺ݇ሻ
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
ሺܤᇱሺݏ ൅ ݇ሻ െ ܥሻ ∗ ܫሺܤᇱሺݏ ൅ ݇ሻ െ ܥ ൐ 0ሻ 
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Online Appendix B: Data Sources, Quality Measures, and Covariates 
 
National Hospital Discharge Survey   
Healthcare quality data is collected from the National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS), a 
nationally-representative sample of inpatient discharge records from short-stay, non-federal 
hospitals.  For approximately 260,000 inpatient records per year, the NHDS contains information 
on, among other things: (a) primary and secondary diagnosis and procedure codes, (b) certain 
demographic characteristics of the patient, and (c) certain characteristics of the hospital.  We 
supplement the public NHDS files with geographic identifiers (restricted-use variables) received 
pursuant to an agreement with the Research Data Center (RDC) at the National Center for Health 
Statistics (NCHS).  All empirical work was performed onsite at the RDC in Hyattsville, 
Maryland.  The resulting sample covers the years 1979 to 2005.  While we also have access to 
the 1977 and 1978 NHDS records, such records use ICD-8 diagnosis codes (as distinct from the 
ICD-9-CM codes used thereafter), complicating the ability to form consistent formulations over 
time of some of the more complicated quality-indicators embraced throughout this analysis.           
Healthcare Quality Measures 
For the purposes of this study, we largely look to the AHRQ for guidance in selecting quality 
metrics.  The AHRQ measures are particularly useful for the present study in so far as they are 
designed for use with administrative inpatient databases such as the NHDS.  The AHRQ’s 
quality indicators are essentially classified into 3 modules: (1) Prevention Quality Indicators 
(PQIs), identifying admissions that could have been avoided through access to high-quality 
outpatient care, (2) Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs), reflecting the quality of care inside 
hospitals including inpatient mortality for certain medical conditions, and (3) Patient Safety 
Indicators (PSIs), focusing on potentially avoidable complications during inpatient care. 
For the purposes of this analysis, we attempt to construct quality metrics that are meant to cover 
each of these three domains.    
Avoidable hospitalizations.   First, we calculate a rate of avoidable hospitalizations (AH) within 
each state-year cell, a measure inspired by the AHRQ’s PQIs.  AH rates, generally, and the PQIs, 
specifically, are measures that are constructed using inpatient data, though meant to reflect the 
quality of care prevailing in the associated outpatient / ambulatory community.  Such measures 
identify conditions (e.g., asthma, diabetes, malignant hypertension, etc.) with respect to which 
proper outpatient care would have prevented the need for hospitalization.  According to the 
AHRQ, their PQIs grew out of research in the early 1990s by Joel Weissman and colleagues.1  
The Weissman et al. (1992) AH classification scheme is designed in slightly more general terms 
                                                            
1 See http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/Downloads/Modules/PQI/PQI%20Summary%20Report.pdf. 
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than the PQIs and thus arguably lends itself to easier codification using a set of NHDS records 
that span several decades (considering the complexity associated with tracking variations in ICD 
classifications over time).2  For this reason, and in light of the fact that Weismann et al. 
developed their classification during the middle of the period in which the NCHS sampled 
physicians to compile the NHDS (unlike the PQIs, which came later), we elect to construct an 
AH rate for this analysis using the Weissman et al. classification.   
To calculate avoidable hospitalization rates for each state and year in the sample, we first count 
the number of hospitalizations within the NHDS records for that state-year cell in which a 
diagnosis is indicated for any of the conditions included in the Weissman et al. (1992) 
classification.  We perform such counts under two alternative approaches: one in which the 
conditions are identified in any one of the indicated diagnosis codes and one in which the 
conditions are identified in the primary diagnosis code only (the preferred approach that we 
take).  To form the relevant rate, it is of course necessary to normalize these AH counts in some 
manner.  Following Frakes (2013), we elect to use measures internal to the NHDS records to 
form the relevant denominator for each state-year AH rate, taking several alternative approaches 
to this normalization.3  In one approach, for example, we normalize each AH count by the 
number of hospitalizations associated with the delivery of a child found in the NHDS records for 
the relevant state and year.  This approach allows for a scaling of the AH count by a measure 
reflective of the size of the associated state-year sample, while also offering a denominator that is 
itself not likely to be significantly impacted by the prevailing malpractice environment (allowing 
for a focus on the influence of malpractice on the AH count comprising the numerator, our 
margin of interest).   
Primarily, however, based on the same premise as the delivery approach and following Frakes 
(2013), we normalize each state-year AH count by an index of hospitalizations equal to the count 
of admissions associated with any of the following conditions and events: (1) acute myocardial 
infarction, (2) stroke, (3) gastro-intestinal bleeding or (4) hip fracture.  Such events represent 
situations characterized by relatively little variation across regions (see, for example, Wennberg 
1984 and Wennberg and Cooper 1999), even in the face of environments that impose varying 
legal and financial incentives (i.e., where such hospitalizations are better seen as proxies for the 
underlying disease environment, as opposed to reflections of immediate healthcare utilization 
                                                            
2 Those conditions represented in the Weissman et al. (1992) classification include: ruptured appendix, asthma, 
cellulitis, congestive heart failure, diabetes, gangrene, hypokalemia, immunizable conditions, malignant 
hypertension, pneumonia, pyelonephritis, and perforated or bleeding ulcer. 
3 The NHDS weights are not designed to generate representative state-specific estimates.  Of course, observing 
within-state changes over time in the set of records included in the state-year cells nonetheless affords the ability to 
identify the intended relationships (Dafny and Gruber 2005).  In any event, though noisier, the results of this 
exercise generally persist under alternative approaches that either (1) multiply observations by the NHDS sample 
weights and form AH rates by dividing weighted AH counts by the total population of that state (yet another 
normalization approach), or (2) forming dependent variables based on the natural log of the state-year AH counts 
(i.e., under no normalization at all).  The primary approaches taken, however, soften some of the sampling 
variability that occurs within states over time, while normalizing by a measure that is more directly reflective of the 
scale of the hospital sampled.   
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decisions).  As such, this index likewise affords an appropriate scaling of the numerator count 
with arguably little concern over the malpractice environment impacting the scaling metric.4  In 
yet another alternative approach, we simply normalize by the count of acute myocardial 
infarction discharges (primary diagnosis only) for the relevant state and year. 
Low-discretionary avoidable hospitalizations.  As an alternative AH rate, we focus on those 
subset of avoidable hospitalizations over which physicians have less discretion in admitting 
patients.  Use of this alternative measure will ease concerns that fluctuations in the liability 
regime will capture changes not just in outpatient quality but in inpatient admission decisions.  
Following Weismann  et al. (1991), Wennberg (1988) and Twigger and Jessop (2000) for 
guidance, we select the following conditions out of the Weissman et al. (1992) conditions as 
being on the lower end of the discretionary scale: ruptured appendix, pneumonia, and congestive 
heart failure. 
Inpatient mortality for selected conditions.  Following the AHRQ’s IQIs, we next construct a 
quality measure in which we calculate the composite rate of inpatient mortality among a sub-
sample of discharges in which the primary diagnosis code indicates any one of the following 
conditions: acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, acute stroke, gastrointestinal bleeding, hip 
fracture or pneumonia.  Such events are generally high volume in occurrence, allowing for robust 
sample sizes.  It is worth noting that such conditions, for the most part, also represent low-
discretionary hospitalizations, whereby inpatient admissions generally follow upon their 
occurrence.5  With this in mind, mortality rates among this sub-sample of admissions can be seen 
as more likely reflective of the quality of care observed during the inpatient stay itself, rather 
than as a result of risk selection by providers or patients.   
Of course, a concern arises regarding fluctuations in the proportions of the various conditions 
comprising this selected-conditions sub-sample.  That is, a reduction in the composite mortality 
rate could arise from a relative increase in the rate of hip fracture admissions (where mortality 
rates are lower for such admissions relative to the other selected conditions), as opposed to 
reductions in mortalities that would actually be attributable to improvements in quality.  We take 
two approaches to dealing with this concern.  First, in some specifications, we include state-year 
controls for the proportion of this sub-sample made up of each of the respective conditions.  In 
the primary approach, however, we follow the AHRQ and standardize the composite mortality 
rate for state-year changes in the various incidences of the conditions. 
To risk adjust mortality rates, we employ an indirect standardization approach, in which we first 
predict the mortality rate that a national sample of patients would be expected to experience if 
                                                            
4 See Frakes (2013) for empirical support over the contention that the incidences of these low-variation conditions 
are not sensitive to medical liability standards.  Note that higher quality outpatient care may be effective at reducing 
some amount of hospitalizations for the above-indicated low-variation conditions, though likely to an extent less 
than quality care may reduce the incidence of the Weissman et al. (1992) avoidable conditions, in which case the 
proposed avoidable hospitalization rate nonetheless identifies a relative quality measure.      
5 For a discussion of the selection of low-discretionary hospitalization categories, see Carter (2003).   
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they faced the relevant patient characteristics of each state-year cell.  We generate such 
predictions based on the estimated coefficients from national, annual regressions of mortality 
incidence on the incidence of the relevant set of conditions.  We then calculate the standardized 
mortality rate by (1) taking the ratio between the observed state-year composite mortality rate 
and this predicted national mortality rate and (2) multiplying this ratio by the observed national 
mortality rate. 
Patient safety incidents and delivery complications.  For the reasons set forth in the text, we 
focus our patient-safety analysis on the delivery-related PSI’s inspired by the AHRQ, which 
represent third and fourth degree lacerations during deliveries (aggregating this analysis across 
vaginal and cesarean deliveries).  Again following Currie and MacLeod (2008), we supplement 
these PSI delivery measures by forming a measure equal to the incidence of preventable delivery 
complications: fetal distress, excessive bleeding, precipitous labor, prolonged labor, or 
dysfunctional labor. 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
Our data source for the cancer-screening analysis is the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS). The data consists of repeated cross-sections for the years 1987 through 2008, 
collected via monthly telephone surveys of individuals aged 18 years and older. The BRFSS is a 
nationally representative survey of the United States and has been conducted by state health 
departments in coordination with the CDC for the purpose of collecting state-level data 
pertaining to certain personal health behaviors. Fifteen states took part in the first survey in 1984. 
By 1994, all 50 states and the District of Columbia became involved. The survey was 
administered to an average of 817 individuals per state in 1984, rising to an average of nearly 
8000 per state in 2008.   
Cancer-Screening Measures 
Sigmoidoscopy / Colonoscopy.  In our primary specification, we aimed to construct a 
proctoscopy screening measure in line with recommended screening guidelines.  As such, we 
focused on the age group between 50 and 75 years old and created an indicator variable equal to 
“1” if the respondent has had a sigmoidoscopy or a colonoscopy within the last 5 years.  In 
alternative specifications we simply indicate whether or not the respondent within this age range 
has ever had a sigmoidoscopy or a colonoscopy.  Proctoscopic examination information within 
the BRFSS is available from 1988 onwards.   
Mammogram.  In our primary specification, we construct a mammogram screening measure in 
line with the recommended screening guidelines in place for most of our sample period.  
Accordingly, limiting our sample to those female respondents with an age between 40 and 75 
year olds, we created an indicator variable reflecting whether or not the respondent received a 
mammogram within the last 2 years.  In alternative specifications, we simply indicate whether or 
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not the respondent within this age range has ever had a mammogram.  Mammography 
information within the BRFSS is available from 1987 onwards.   
Physical breast exam.  Likewise in line with recommended guidelines, our primary 
specifications construct physical or clinical breast exam utilization measures by looking at the 
sample of at least 40 years of age and asking whether or not they have had a break exam within 
the last year.  In alternative specifications, we simply indicate whether or not they have ever had 
a physical breast exam.  Physical breast exam information within the BRFSS is available from 
1990 onwards.      
PSA Testing.  Consistent with recommendations, at least with respect to those recommendations 
operating over our sample period, we focus on the sample of males over the age of 50 (and under 
the age of 75) and construct an indicator regarding whether or not they have received Prostate-
Specific Antigen (PSA) Testing within the last year.  In alternative specifications, we simply 
indicate whether or not they have ever had PSA testing.  PSA testing information within the 
BRFSS is available from 2001 onwards.  
Digital Rectal Exam.  Consistent with recommendations, at least with respect to those 
recommendations operating over our sample period, we focus on the sample of males over the 
age of 50 (and under the age of 75) and construct an indicator regarding whether or not they have 
received a Digital Rectal Exam (DRE) within the last year.  In alternative specifications, we 
simply indicate whether or not they have ever had a DRE.  DRE information within the BRFSS 
is available from 1988 onwards, though not at sufficient numbers until 1993 onwards (with 
several years omitted in the late 1990s). 
Pap smear.    Consistent with recommendations, at least with respect to those recommendations 
operating over our sample period, we focus on the sample of females 21 years old and over and 
construct an indicator regarding whether or not they have received pap testing within the last 
year.  In alternative specifications, we simply indicate whether or not they have ever had a pap 
smear.  Pap testing information within the BRFSS is available from 1987 onwards. 
 
Other Tort Reforms   
A number of specifications include the incidence of additional tort measures as covariates, 
including reforms of the collateral source rule, caps on punitive-damages awards and other 
“indirect” tort reforms.  Traditional collateral source rules generally prohibited defendants from 
introducing evidence of compensatory payments made to plaintiffs from outside sources (e.g., 
insurers).  Thirty-three states currently have laws in place that eliminate this traditional rule, 
effectively reducing the scope of compensatory damage awards.  Much of these reforms likewise 
occurred during the mid-1980s; however, there are a substantial amount of independent reforms 
of each type, facilitating identification of their separate impacts.   
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Punitive damages are awarded on a much rarer basis in malpractice actions than are non-
economic damages awards (without a correspondingly large increase in average payouts).6  Thus, 
relative to non-economic damages, it is arguable that the threat of liability for punitive damages 
will have a weaker impact on physician behavior.  Nonetheless, despite the infrequent 
application of such awards, considering that punitive damages are generally not insured by 
liability carriers, it remains reasonable to believe that physicians may be sensitive to the threat 
posed by punitive awards (Malani and Reif 2012).  Finally, following the classification of 
malpractice reforms introduced by Kessler and McClellan (1996), we estimate the general 
impact associated with a residual reform category (labeled “indirect” reforms) that includes 
contingency fee limitations, requirements of periodic payment of future damages, joint and 
several liability reforms, and provisions for a patients’ compensation fund.7   
 
Other Covariates (by Quality Indicator) 
Inpatient mortality rate for selected medical conditions.  In the case of the mortality rates 
specifications, estimated according to equation (1) in the text, Xs,t represents certain 
demographic characteristics: the percentage of patients in various age-sex categories,8 race 
categories (white, black and other), insurance categories (private, government, no insurance and 
other), along with the percentage of patients visiting hospitals of various bed sizes (0-100, 100-
200, 200-300, 300-500 and 500+ beds) and of various ownership types (proprietary, non-profit 
and government).9  Zs,t represents certain other state-year characteristics (HMO penetration rate 
and its square, physician concentration rate, and median household income).10 
                                                            
6 For evidence of this claim, see Cohen (2005) and Hyman et al. (2009).   
7 The results presented below for the damage caps and collateral source rule reform coefficients are entirely robust to 
inclusion of a richer set of controls for each of the individual components of Kessler and McClellan's indirect reform 
category.  
8 Age-sex categories for the inpatient mortality and AH specifications are as follows: male under 30, female under 
30, male 30-45, female 30-45, male 45-55, female 45-55, male 55-65, female 55-65, male 65-75, female 65-75, male 
over 75 and female over 75.  Age-sex categories for the obstetric specifications are as follows: 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 
30-34, 35-39 and 40+ years old.   
9  We form the incidences of the relevant demographic variables using the NHDS sample itself, though the results 
are entirely robust to alternative state-year controls based off of the Census data.  Following Frakes (2013), in the 
AH rate and mortality rate specifications, we form the relevant incidences using the sample of discharges in which 
patients present themselves for acute myocardial infarction, stroke, gastro-intestinal bleeding or hip fracture.  This 
subsample consists of patients that will almost universally seek hospitalization upon the occurrence of the event, in 
which case the sample itself is generally not sensitive to the prevailing legal environment.  In any event, the results 
of this exercise are also robust to the formation of the demographic covariates using the entire sample of state-year 
NHDS discharges.  In the obstetrics specifications, we form all relevant incidences using the subsample of 
discharges associated with deliveries.       
10 HMO penetration rates are from Interstudy Publications.  Household income data is from the decennial Census 
files and the American Community Surveys.  Data on physician population counts are from the American Medical 
Association (AMA) administrative records and were obtained from the Area Resource File.   
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In alternative specifications, we also control for the average length of stay associated with 
hospitalizations for such medical conditions.  To the extent that medical liability forces also 
impact lengths of stay for such hospitalizations, any such development could confound the 
estimation of liability forces on inpatient mortality rates insofar as longer hospitalizations 
otherwise increase the probability of an inpatient mortality.  The results are virtually unchanged 
with such controls.  Supporting this insensitivity to the inclusion of length-of-stay controls, we 
also find, in separate specifications (available upon request), no association between the adoption 
of the various reforms and the length of stay associated with hospitalizations for the selected 
medical conditions.     
Avoidable hospitalization rates.  Xs,t and Zs,t in the AH rate specifications are identical to those 
of the inpatient mortality rate specifications. 
Maternal trauma rates and delivery complication rates.  In the obstetrics specifications, X 
includes mother’s age (15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39 and 40+ years old); mother’s race 
(white, black and other); mother’s insurance status (private, government, no insurance and 
other); hospital bed size (0-100, 100-200, 200-300, 300-500 and 500+ beds); and hospital 
ownership type (proprietary, non-profit and government).  Zs,t includes the state-year fertility 
rate, the state-year OB-GYN concentration rate,11 the HMO penetration rate (and its square), and 
median household income.  Obstetric specifications also include controls for cesarean delivery 
and episiotomy utilization.  The maternal trauma specifications also include a control capturing 
the risk-status associated with the delivery, specified following Frakes (2013) as the predicted 
probability of cesarean delivery (PPC).  PPC values are calculated using fitted values of a logit 
model (estimated annually) of the incidence of cesarean delivery on a set of individual risk 
factors and complications.  We include this measure from Frakes (2013) simply as a way to 
capture all such risk factors and complications in a single measure.  The results are robust to 
including separate indicator variables for all such measures.  Note that we exclude this control in 
the main specification of the delivery complications specification given that the outcome variable 
in that context is meant to capture certain of those complications itself.  In alternative 
specifications of the delivery complications approach, we also include controls for all non-
preventable complications and risk factors.  The results are virtually identical under such 
alternative specifications (available upon request).      
Cancer Screening Rates.  X in the cancer screening specifications includes various individual 
characteristics provided for in the BRFSS files: marital status (married, widowed, divorced, 
single), race (white, black, and other), educational attainment category, Hispanic origin, income 
(and its square), age category (by age deciles), and smoking status.  Z includes certain 
characteristics of the prevailing state-year health care market (including physician concentration 
                                                            
11 Fertility rates are calculated according to Gruber and Owings (1996) as the number of births per population and 
come from the Vital Statistics Natality files (also obtained via the ARF).   
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rate and the average number of hospital beds per capita),12 along with HMO penetration rates and 
its square.   
 
     
                                                            
1212 Average hospital bed data was likewise obtained from the ARF. 
11 
 
Online Appendix C: Additional Robustness Checks 
 
Dynamic Difference-in-Difference Results 
 
Table C1.  Relationship between Damage Caps and the AHRQ-Inspired Quality Indicators: Dynamic 
Difference-in-Difference Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
INPATIENT 
MORTALITY 
RATE 
AH RATE 
LOW-
DISCRETION 
AH RATE 
MATERNAL 
TRAUMA RATE 
PREVENTABLE 
DELIVERY 
COMPLICA-
TIONS 
Non-Economic Damage 
Cap 
     
4-Year Lead Dummy 
-0.084*** 
(0.030) 
0.023 
(0.032) 
0.037   
 (0.027) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
3-Year Lead Dummy 
-0.012 
(0.034) 
-0.030      
(0.020) 
-0.028      
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.010 
 (0.006) 
2-Year Lead Dummy 
-0.010 
(0.056) 
-0.001      
(0.027) 
-0.006      
(0.031) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
1-Year Lead Dummy 
0.027 
(0.041) 
-0.008     
(0.017) 
-0.008       
(0.024) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Contemporaneous 
Dummy 
-0.046 
(0.048) 
0.009 
(0.028) 
0.007 
(0.031) 
0.001 
(0.003)   
0.004 
(0.005) 
1-Year Lag Dummy 
0.031 
(0.066) 
0.015 
(0.031) 
-0.004      
(0.023) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
2-Year Lag Dummy 
0.034 
(0.067) 
-0.065**     
(0.025) 
-0.063**     
(0.025) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.012     
(0.011) 
3-Year Lag Dummy  
0.033 
(0.054) 
0.038       
(0.027) 
0.042  
(0.027) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
4-Year Lag Dummy 
-0.041 
(0.049) 
0.022 
(0.022) 
-0.002      
(0.020) 
-0.002 
 (0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.  Each 
specification controls for state fixed effects, year fixed effects, various covariates and a set of state specific linear time 
trends.  Specifications are weighted per their counterparts in Tables 4-7 of the text and otherwise track the specifications 
in such tables.  Dependent variables in Columns 1 – 3 (representing state-year means of the respective measures) are 
logged.  Dependent variables in Columns 4 and 5 represent the individual incidence of the respective measure. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table C2.  Relationship between Damage Caps and Cancer Screening Rates: Dynamic 
Difference-in-Difference Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MAMMO-
GRAM 
PHYSICAL 
BREAST EXAM 
PROCTO-
SCOPIC EXAM PSA TESTING 
DIGITAL 
RECTAL EXAM PAP SMEAR 
Non-Economic Damage 
Cap 
     
 
4-Year Lead Dummy 
-0.009      
(0.006) 
-0.006       
(0.006) 
-0.019***    
(0.007) 
0.013      
(0.015) 
0.007      
(0.017) 
-0.003      
(0.006) 
3-Year Lead Dummy 
0.007      
(0.004) 
0.010      
(0.008) 
-0.004      
(0.007) 
-0.023      
(0.016) 
-0.009      
(0.015) 
0.015*     
(0.007) 
2-Year Lead Dummy 
0.005      
(0.006) 
-0.001      
(0.008) 
-0.002      
(0.007) 
0.022*     
(0.011) 
0.018      
(0.012) 
-0.002      
(0.007) 
1-Year Lead Dummy 
0.017**      
(0.007) 
0.032***   
(0.007) 
-0.001       
(0.011) 
0.024***    
(0.009) 
-0.006      
(0.014) 
0.025***   
(0.006) 
Contemporaneous 
Dummy 
-0.023***   
(0.006) 
-0.019**     
(0.008) 
-0.022      
(0.014) 
0.017      
(0.014) 
0.027      
(0.018) 
-0.018***  
(0.007) 
1-Year Lag Dummy 
0.019**     
(0.007) 
0.021      
(0.011) 
0.018      
(0.010) 
-0.008      
(0.010) 
-0.043**      
(0.018) 
0.021**     
(0.010) 
2-Year Lag Dummy 
0.000      
(0.006) 
0.001      
(0.009)   
-0.007      
(0.009) 
0.043**     
(0.019) 
0.032      
(0.018) 
-0.004      
(0.010) 
3-Year Lag Dummy 
0.002      
(0.008) 
-0.000      
(0.009) 
0.013      
(0.009) 
0.003      
(0.017) 
-0.017      
(0.015) 
0.014       
(0.012) 
4-Year Lag Dummy 
0.002      
(0.006) 
0.001        
(0.007) 
-0.009       
(0.008) 
0.022**     
(0.010) 
-0.009      
(0.012) 
0.005      
(0.006) 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.  Each specification 
controls for state fixed effects, year fixed effects, various covariates and a set of state specific linear time trends.   
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table C3.  Relationship between National Standard Laws and the AHRQ-Inspired Quality Indicators in Initially Low-Quality Areas: Dynamic 
Difference-in-Difference Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
INPATIENT 
MORTALITY 
RATE 
AH RATE 
LOW-
DISCRETION 
AH RATE 
MATERNAL 
TRAUMA RATE 
PREVENTABLE 
DELIVERY 
COMPLICA-
TIONS 
Non-Economic Damage 
Cap 
     
4-Year Lead Dummy 
-0.041      
(0.122) 
0.075       
(0.086) 
0.101       
(0.070) 
-0.034      
(0.171) 
0.001       
(0.132) 
3-Year Lead Dummy 
-0.139      
(0.081) 
0.029       
(0.136) 
0.082       
(0.169) 
-0.143      
(0.299) 
-0.051      
(0.081) 
2-Year Lead Dummy 
0.095        
(0.091) 
-0.004      
(0.074) 
0.025 
(0.082) 
0.134      
(0.255) 
-0.135*      
(0.067) 
1-Year Lead Dummy 
0.120       
(0.134) 
-0.064       
(0.077) 
-0.116 
(0.094) 
0.193**     
(0.076) 
0.040       
(0.154) 
Contemporaneous 
Dummy 
-0.107      
(0.074) 
-0.007      
(0.089) 
-0.004 
(0.083) 
-0.470**     
(0.207) 
-0.447***    
(0.137) 
1-Year Lag Dummy 
-0.032      
(0.079) 
-0.233      
(0.139) 
-0.257*      
(0.141) 
0.048      
(0.327) 
0.283**     
(0.136) 
2-Year Lag Dummy 
-0.077      
(0.122) 
0.049       
(0.066) 
0.027       
(0.072) 
0.141       
(0.165) 
-0.152      
(0.092) 
3-Year Lag Dummy 
0.084      
(0.153) 
-0.135      
(0.102) 
-0.138 
(0.100) 
-0.189      
(0.180) 
0.159       
(0.147) 
4-Year Lag Dummy 
-0.130      
(0.095) 
-0.165       
(0.135) 
-0.183      
(0.137) 
-0.116      
(0.160) 
0.011      
 (0.126) 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.  Each 
specification controls for state fixed effects, year fixed effects, various covariates and a set of state specific linear time 
trends.  Specifications are weighted per their counterparts in Tables 9-12 of the text.  Dependent variables are logged.   
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table C4.  Relationship between National Standard Laws and the AHRQ-Inspired Quality Indicators in Initially High-Quality Areas: Dynamic 
Difference-in-Difference Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
INPATIENT 
MORTALITY 
RATE 
AH RATE 
LOW-
DISCRETION 
AH RATE 
MATERNAL 
TRAUMA RATE 
PREVENTABLE 
DELIVERY 
COMPLICA-
TIONS 
Non-Economic Damage 
Cap 
     
4-Year Lead Dummy 
-0.172 
(0.103) 
-0.084      
(0.055) 
-0.059 
(0.051) 
0.124       
(0.196) 
-0.041 
(0.137) 
3-Year Lead Dummy 
0.000 
(0.111) 
-0.067      
(0.105) 
-0.142 
(0.135) 
-0.197      
(0.230) 
-0.134 
(0.139) 
2-Year Lead Dummy 
0.286 
(0.284) 
0.102       
(0.059) 
0.127 
(.0.078) 
-0.115      
(0.134) 
-0.000 
(0.091) 
1-Year Lead Dummy 
-0.058 
(0.147) 
-0.086      
(0.075) 
-0.082 
(0.082) 
0.346*       
(0.202) 
0.020 
(0.151) 
Contemporaneous 
Dummy 
0.098 
(0.269) 
0.033 
(0.075) 
-0.017 
(0.098) 
-0.381***    
(0.130) 
-0.059 
(0.273) 
1-Year Lag Dummy 
-0.226 
(0.193) 
-0.049      
(0.075) 
0.000 
(0.099) 
0.121       
(0.211) 
0.012 
(0.168) 
2-Year Lag Dummy 
0.219 
(0.254) 
0.035 
(0.031) 
0.085** 
(0.033) 
-0.124      
(0.121) 
0.053 
(0.128) 
3-Year Lag Dummy 
-0.002 
(0.147) 
-0.063*      
(0.032) 
-0.108** 
(0.040) 
0.340       
(0.188) 
-0.053 
(0.125) 
4-Year Lag Dummy 
0.015 
(0.112) 
0.018       
(0.029) 
0.037 
(0.039) 
0.009      
(0.231) 
0.080 
(0.086) 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.  Each 
specification controls for state fixed effects, year fixed effects, various covariates and a set of state specific linear time 
trends.  Specifications are weighted per their counterparts in Tables 9-12 of the text.  Dependent variables are logged. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
To supplement the above dynamic difference-in-difference tables, we have also produced 
graphical depictions of the indicated findings.  Rather than presenting the full set of findings 
graphically, however, we only present those bearing on the hypothesis: physicians will respond 
to standard-of-care reforms that entail the expectation of higher levels of quality by delivering 
higher quality care.  Note that higher levels of care entail lower levels of the AHRQ quality 
indicators.  As such, we expect to observe a decline in such much measures following national 
standard adoptions in those states that begin with below-average rates and with respect to which 
the reform entails a heightening of standards.  For the reasons indicated below (and in the text), 
we focus this analysis on the AHRQ-inspired indicators.  The figure effectively plots the time 
trend in the differential quality rate between treatment and control states on a year-by-year basis, 
where time is measured with reference to years prior to and subsequent to a national standard 
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adoption, where this differential is normalized to 0 in the base period (the period of time prior to 
4 years before the reform). 13  The dashed lines in the figures represent the top and bottom of the 
95 percent confidence intervals for the respective coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
13 In the below figures, time is set such that year “1” in the graph represents the time in which the 
national standard reform is adopted.  We do this (rather than setting it at year “0”) so that any 
decline in the indicator (representing an improvement in quality) observed over the first year will 
manifest itself as a downward slope between year 0 and year 1 in the graph, rather than year -1 
and 0 if we were to set the year of reform at year 0, providing the misleading impression that the 
decline in the indicator emerged prior to the reform.  
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Additional Specification Checks 
Construction of Avoidable Hospitalization Rates.  The results presented in the text are robust to 
alternative constructions of the AH Rates, including those constructions that (1) flag avoidable 
hospitalizations using any diagnosis field, not just the primary diagnosis field, (2) normalize 
avoidable hospitalization counts by the number of deliveries of children in the associated state-
year cell (an alternative measure of the size of the cell that is not itself subject to influence by the 
prevailing liability environment), (3) normalize avoidable hospitalization counts by the number 
of acute myocardial infarctions in the associated state-year cell (rather than the low-variations 
health index that likewise includes strokes, hip fractures and gastro-intestinal bleedings), (4) use 
non-logged AH rates as the dependent variable and (5) focus only on the adult (18-plus) 
population.  For instance, when using just acute myocardial infarctions as the denominator in the 
AH rate, the 95 percent confidence bound for the non-economic damage cap coefficient becomes 
[-0.092,0.063] as compared with [-0.068, 0.048] from Column 3 of Table 5.  Similarly, those 
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confidence bound becomes [-0.034, 0.058] when using any diagnosis code and [-0.046, 0.058] 
when focusing only on the adult population.  For the purposes of brevity, we avoid setting forth 
this full set of findings.  However, these results are available upon request from the authors.   
Construction of Inpatient Mortality Rate for Selected Medical Conditions.  The results presented 
in the text are robust to alternative constructions of the inpatient mortality rate for selected 
medical conditions, including those constructions that (1) use non-logged mortality rates as the 
dependent variable, (2) specify the outcome variable as the incidence of mortality out of an 
individual sample of admissions for the selected medical conditions (as distinct from the primary 
specification whose unit of observation is a given state-year cell), (3) use mortality rates as the 
dependent variable that are not risk adjusted for fluctuations in the state-year incidence of the 
underlying medical conditions, but instead include as covariates the incidence of such conditions, 
and (4) focus the analysis only on the adult population.  For instance, when including the 
incidence of the underlying medical conditions as covariates (rather than risk adjusting mortality 
rates ahead of time for such conditions), we estimate a 95 percent confidence band for the non-
economic damage cap coefficient becomes [-0.095, 0.024] as compared with [-0.099, 0.022] 
from Column 3 of Table 4.  For the purposes of brevity, we avoid setting forth this full set of 
findings.  However, these results are available upon request from the authors. 
Note that the unit of observation in the inpatient mortality rate specification estimated in the text 
is a given state-year cell.  In an alternative approach (not shown), we estimate linear probability 
models where the unit of observation is an individual discharge within the sample of inpatient 
admissions associated with the selected conditions (e.g., acute myocardial infarctions, strokes, 
etc.) and where the dependent variable is an indicator for inpatient mortality (in such models, we 
include controls for the incidence of the relevant conditions).  The results from this alternative 
approach are (perhaps not surprisingly) nearly identical to those of the state-year specifications 
estimated in Table 4 in the text. 
Cancer Screening / Damage-Cap Results.  The cancer screening results presented in Table 8 of 
the text are robust to a number of alternative formulations of the relevant cancer screening 
measures, including alternative formulations of the age restrictions (e.g., those 40 – 75 years old 
in the case of proctoscopic examination, instead of 50 – 75) and alternative framing of the 
frequency of the screening—that is, using all of the frequency formulations provided by the 
BRFSS (e.g., annual, every 2 years, every 5 years, etc.).  In the interests of brevity, we do not 
present the full extent of these alternative formulations, though they are available upon request 
from the authors.  We do, however, present in the following table results (analogous to those 
from Table 8 in the text) using the incidence of ever having had the relevant screening test as the 
operable dependent variable.       
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Table C5.  Relationship between Remedy-Centric Tort Reforms and Cancer Screening Rates.  Alternative Formulation:  
Incidence of Ever Having the Indicated Screening  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
 MAMMO-
GRAM 
PHYSICAL 
BREAST 
EXAM 
PROCTO-
SCOPIC 
EXAM 
PSA 
TESTING 
DIGITAL 
RECTAL 
EXAM 
PAP 
SMEAR 
       
Non-Economic Damage Cap 0.008*       (0.005) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.004      
(0.005) 
0.008      
(0.008) 
-0.002      
(0.002) 
95% Confidence Band for 
Coefficient of Non-
Economic Damage Cap 
Variable 
[-0.001, 
0.019] 
[-0.006, 
0.006] 
[-0.018, 
0.010] 
[-0.015, 
0.007] 
[-0.009, 
0.025] 
[-0.007, 
0.002] 
95% Confidence Band, 
scaled by mean screening 
rate 
[-0.001, 
0.026] 
[-0.010, 
0.010] 
[-0.045, 
0.025] 
[-0.028, 
0.013] 
[-0.018, 
0.050] 
[-0.011, 
0.004] 
N 1010415 1156433 849445 252313 341102 1664055 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in 
parentheses.  All regressions included state and year fixed effects.  
Source: 1987 – 2008 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Records. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
   
Table 8 in the text presents results from the basic difference‐in‐difference specification without the 
various control variables included.  Table C2 above, which includes a full set of leads and lags of the 
damage‐cap variable, presents results from specifications that include a range of covariates (as set forth 
in Online Appendix B above) along with a set of state‐specific linear time trends.   
 
Randomization Inference.  Following Frakes (2013), we also endeavored to take an alternative route 
towards estimating the standard errors associated with our estimates.  Accordingly, using the sample of 
observations from our control states, we simulate a set of placebo laws that match the distribution of 
timing of actual reforms.  We then estimate the association between the relevant quality indicator and 
the placebo laws, replicating this process 5,000 times.  We then observe where the actual coefficient 
from our primary specifications falls in the distribution of coefficients generated through these 
simulations.  Due to time limitations on our use with the data at the NCHS’s Research Data Center, we 
have only performed this exercise on the liability standards analysis for the inpatient mortality rate for 
selected medical conditions.  In the text, we demonstrate that such mortality rates fall by 7.6 percent—
representing an improvement in quality—upon a national standard adoption in those treatments states 
that begin the sample with above‐average inpatient mortality rates—i.e., in those states with initially 
lower‐than‐average quality.  While we find that this estimate is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level in the main text, we find that this estimate is only significant at the 10 percent level through this 
randomization inference approach (the estimated ‐7.6 coefficient falls within the bottom 4.5th percentile 
of this simulated distribution).    
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Tort‐Law Generally Damage Caps  
Damage‐cap adoptions in many states applied to tort cases broadly, not simply those pertaining to 
medical malpractice.  Damage‐cap adoptions in other states applied only to medical malpractice 
situations.  General tort‐law caps are arguably likely to pose fewer legislative endogeneity concerns.  As 
such, in other specifications, we replicate the damage‐cap analysis by codifying caps using only those 
adoptions that apply to tort laws more broadly, dropping those states from the analysis that adopted 
caps in malpractice‐specific contexts.  If anything, the results of this alternative analysis suggest an even 
more modest decrease in health care quality connected with damage cap adoptions.  For instance, in 
the case of avoidable hospitalization rates, the coefficient of this modified damage‐cap variable is ‐0.03, 
with a 95 percent confidence interval of [‐0.08,0.02].  In the case of inpatient mortality rates for selected 
medical conditions, the coefficient is ‐0.04, with a 95 percent confidence interval of [‐0.11, 0.04].  The 
full set of results for this alternative approach are available upon request.   
 
Cancer Screening Liability Standards Analysis.   
As stated in the text, data is available for cancer screening rates over a period of time in which 
only 3 states modified their standard of care rules: Delaware, Indiana, and Rhode Island.  
Moreover, only with respect to mammography and pap testing is data available over the full 
BRFSS period, facilitating any ability to draw upon the experiences of these three treatment 
states and to properly test for pre-period trends.  A further difficulty comes with the fact that 
even fewer treatment states are available to test the main hypothesis of interest—i.e., that quality 
will rise in connection with national standard adoptions among those states that begin the sample 
period with initially low-levels of quality.  With respect to mammography, only Indiana is 
available as a treatment state by which to test this hypothesis.  With respect to pap testing, both 
Indiana and Rhode Island are available for such purposes.  While the results of this exercise are 
arguably unreliable with such few treatment states, we nonetheless present results estimating the 
relationship between national standard adoptions and the incidence of mammogram screening 
and pap testing in those states that began with lower than average screening rates and thus with 
respect to which national standard adoptions arguably represent a heightening of expectations.14  
In Table C6, we demonstrate how these findings are impacted by (1) the inclusion of the relevant 
set of covariates discussed in Online Appendix B, (2) the inclusion of state-specific linear time 
trends and (3) the inclusion of a set of leads and lags of the national standard variable.  Note that 
the analysis below only includes 3 lead periods considering that there are not enough years 
between the beginning of the sample and Indiana’s essential reform to facilitate the estimation of 
a 4-year lead period. 
                                                            
14 We focus here on estimating the impact of heightened liability standards as opposed to diminished standards.  
Estimation of this latter type of variation in the law is also compromised by such few treatment groups.  
Nonetheless, results of this alternative exercise are available upon request.  If anything, the results actually suggest 
that screening rates also increase slightly upon national standard adoptions in those 1‐2 states that adopt such 
reforms when they arguably entail a slackening of standards.   
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The findings weakly demonstrate that when liability standards change so as to arguably require a 
heightening of standards, cancer screening rates increase.  In the case of mammography 
screening, rates generally increase subsequent to the reform, strongest with a long lag.  However, 
mammography screening also spiked strongly with a 2-year lead creating some concerns that the 
increase in quality may reflect a trend that pre-dated the reform.  Of course, 1-year lead 
coefficient does not support any such trend.  Pap testing likewise suggests an increase in 
screening rates with a long lag, while also raising a concern of a pre-period trend, with a strong 
increase in rates occurring in the year prior to the reform.  While this may in part be a reflection 
of an anticipation effect (Malani and Reif 2012), it may also be reflective of some external factor 
that correlates (perhaps spuriously) with the increase in screening and with the adoption of the 
liability reform.    
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TABLE C6.  The Relationship between National-Standard Laws and the Incidence of Cancer Screening 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MAMMOGRAM SCREENING PAPSMEAR SCREENING 
National Standard Law       
3-Year Lead Dummy - 
0.012**   
(0.005) 
0.014* 
(0.007) 
- 
0.038 
(0.029) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
2-Year Lead Dummy - 
0.046***   
(0.005) 
0.048*** 
(0.006) 
- 
-0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.014 
(0.015) 
1-Year Lead Dummy - 
-0.020*  
(0.011) 
-0.000 
(0.009) 
- 
0.029* 
(0.015) 
0.023* 
(0.012) 
Contemporaneous 
Dummy 
0.040***   
(0.006) 
.0140944   
.0102652 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.045 
(0.033) 
-0.007 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.027) 
1-Year Lag Dummy - 
-0.003   
(0.023) 
0.025** 
(0.12) 
- 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
2-Year Lag Dummy - 
0.019 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
- 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
3-Year Lag Dummy - 
-0.036* 
(0.021) 
-0.030 
(0.023) 
- 
0.004 
(0.020) 
-0.002 
(0.021) 
4-Year Lag Dummy - 
0.030*** 
(0.007) 
0.025** 
(0.012) 
- 
0.022* 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.014) 
          N 631592 520955 520955 1098595 912364 912364 
Control Variables? NO YES YES NO YES YES 
State-Specific Linear 
Trends? NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.  All 
regressions include state and year fixed effects.  The regressions also include a separate dummy variable indicating 
whether the state has an initially below-average cancer screen rate (coefficient omitted).  Cancer screening data is from 
the BRFSS. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
